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INTRODUCTION
From his early days as a practitioner in the 1960s, Joe Brodley has served
the field of competition law brilliantly as a scholar, teacher, and mentor.
Beyond his contributions as a superb analyst, Joe used his formidable skills
with a great humanity. There is a note in a bottle quality to being an academic.
It can take years to tell if anyone took the bottle from the sea, read the note, or
acted on its contents. Joe has realized the deep satisfaction of knowing with
certainty that many embraced and benefitted from his teaching and guidance.
By participating in this Conference, we are pleased to celebrate him.
The Conference provides an occasion to reflect upon how the discipline of
antitrust law has changed in the four decades since Joe began his legal career.
One striking development is the growing significance of comparative study.
By the mid-1960s, a handful of nations had adopted antitrust laws. Today the
number of competition systems approaches 110. To those of a certain age, this
development is most improbable. For example, who foresaw in 1967, the year
Joe’s article on oligopoly appeared in the Stanford Law Review,1 the 2009
formation of the BRIC antitrust network – an endeavor that links the
competition agencies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China? In the early stages
of Joe’s scholarship, none of those countries – least of all China and Russia –
seemed likely candidates to enact antitrust laws.
The role of the United States has changed substantially amid the global
adoption of competition laws. Years ago, the United States was chiefly an
exporter of antitrust ideas. Today the experience of other jurisdictions
increasingly offers a useful means for assessing the quality of the U.S. system
and illuminates areas for improvement.2 In this Article we focus upon an area
in which greater convergence of U.S. policy with the practice of many foreign
countries is long overdue: the treatment of public policies that suppress
competition. Whereas the European Union (“EU”) and numerous other
jurisdictions have taken strong measures to limit restraints imposed by national

1

See Joseph F. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts – From
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285, 288-89 (1967).
2 On the relevance of foreign experience in informing the development of competition
policy in the United States, see WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT
100: INTO OUR 2ND CENTURY 1-9 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/
workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf; William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy
Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 361, 363
(2000) [hereinafter Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform].
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government authorities and political subdivisions,3 U.S. antitrust policy in
many ways is more tolerant of public restraints upon business rivalry. Since
the early twentieth century, Supreme Court doctrines have evolved to grant
states and the federal government broad rights to enact laws that restrain
competition.4 Further, individual groups are largely free to lobby for laws
designed to erect marketplace barriers, and in many cases to mire their
competitors in a morass of governmental processes.5
Currently, advocacy is the primary tool available to both public and private
enforcers of the U.S. antitrust laws to challenge state-imposed restraints on
competition. Because government action (and private conduct to obtain such
action) is challengeable in only relative narrow circumstances, much of the
battle takes place in the legislative and regulatory arenas rather than in courts.
Faced with the prospect of being legislated out of business, trade groups invest
mightily in lobbying. Too often there are no trade groups to counter
anticompetitive legislation, leaving the U.S. federal antitrust agencies (the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”)) to devote modest resources to persuade state, and
occasionally federal, regulators and legislators to consider competitive effects
in formulating policy.
Although the U.S. competition advocacy program has achieved important
success, it is not enough. United States enforcers should stand on equal
footing with their EU and other foreign counterparts in being able to challenge
state action that threatens competition in the same manner as they can
challenge private conduct. This need, moreover, is increasingly urgent given
the larger role that government now plays in the economy in the wake of the
financial crisis.6
To that end, Part I of the Article presents reasons why public restraints upon
competition should be a stronger concern of U.S. competition policy. Part II
reviews the existing array of measures by which the U.S. competition policy
system can challenge government restraints on rivalry. Part III then describes
measures available to competition authorities in other jurisdictions to resist
encroachments by government policies on the competitive process. Finally,
Part IV suggests approaches by which the framework of controls upon

3

Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform, supra note 2, at 400-04 (describing
measures taken by relatively new competition systems to forestall public restraints upon
competition); Timothy J. Muris, State Intervention/State Action – A U.S. Perspective, 2004
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 517, 523 (praising EU policies that limit public restraints upon
competition).
4 See infra notes 39-121 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
6 For example, through its efforts to rescue traditional North American automobile
producers, the U.S. government has become a majority shareholder in General Motors. Neil
King, Jr. & Sharon Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J., June 2,
2009, at A1.
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anticompetitive government policies could be strengthened in the United
States.
I.

WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF STATE
ACTION?

Most competition policy specialists have heard Adam Smith’s caution that
“[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public.”7 They
are less familiar with the passage that immediately follows Smith’s famous
admonition in The Wealth of Nations. “It is impossible indeed to prevent such
meetings,” Smith wrote, “by any law which either could be executed, or would
be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people
of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing
to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.”8
In these observations, Smith anticipated the two fronts of the battle that
competition policy systems would have to wage to be successful. Competition
laws would need to subdue efforts by private economic actors and public
entities to suppress business rivalry. In the discussion below, we consider why
a program that does the former without addressing the latter ultimately is
unavailing.
A.

Recognition of the Threat of State-Imposed Restraints to Competition Is
Widely Shared in the United States and Abroad

Policy makers sometimes can justify regulations that restrict competition
when faced with markets that fail to produce goods or services that consumers
value. For example, some markets may be so fraught with informational
asymmetries between producers and consumers that governmental assurance of
quality is warranted. Although regulation in these instances may deprive
consumers of some of the benefits of competition, it may be warranted when
the benefits of correcting market failures exceed the opportunity costs of
displaced competition.
Regulation, however, also can be used to restrict competition, to transfer
wealth from consumers to a favored industry, rather than to improve consumer
welfare. A large body of commentary recognizes that public intervention cast
as pro-consumer legislation can serve mainly to transfer wealth from
consumers to a favored industry.9 Observers from a wide range of perspectives
have emphasized this phenomenon. In the 1950s, Walter Adams and Horace
Gray drew attention to how numerous public policies damaged the competitive
process and warranted closer attention as part of a comprehensive national
7

ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (1776).
Id.
9 For an excellent recent review of this commentary, see D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting
Anticompetitive Government Interventions that Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 119, 120 (2009).
8
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competition policy.10 In the same decade, Donald Turner and Carl Kaysen’s
famous synthesis of competition law and economics observed that “legislative
exceptions cover significant areas of the nation’s economy” and raised
questions about “the economic justifications for exceptions to competition
policy.”11 In the early 1960s, Gabriel Kolko challenged the public interest
interpretation of federal regulatory measures adopted in the first decades of the
twentieth century and concluded that major business interests supported these
measures to hamper rivals and serve their own economic ends.12 In the early
1970s, a study sponsored by Ralph Nader denounced the anticompetitive
effects of federal regulatory schemes governing areas such as communications,
electric power, international trade, public procurement, and transportation.13
The notion that regulation is produced in a black box to maximize social
welfare has given way to what has become known as the economic theory of
regulation (“ETR”).14 The foundation of ETR is that politicians and
constituents are rational economic actors. As such, constituents demand
favorable regulation and politicians use the state’s coercive power to supply it
in return for political support. When adopting a policy, regulators weigh
political support from those who stand to gain against political opposition from
those who stand to lose. The interest group most able to translate its demand
10

WALTER ADAMS & HORACE M. GRAY, MONOPOLY IN AMERICA 177 (1955).
CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 189 (1959).
12 GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 2 (1963).
13 RALPH NADER, THE MONOPOLY MAKERS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON
REGULATION AND COMPETITION 35, 103, 193, 227, 319 (Mark J. Green ed., 1973).
14 Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 373 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory
of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212-13 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 4-18 (1971). ETR has generated a
vast amount of empirical literature confirming the theoretical model. For example, several
studies have shown a strong statistical relationship between campaign contributions and
congressional voting. See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 330-31 (3d ed. 2000). However, note that although several empirical studies are
consistent with ETR, taken as a whole the empirical support for ETR is “mixed.” Id. at 330;
Henry W. Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A
Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 77, 77-80 (1982); Henry W.
Chappell, Jr., Campaign Contributions and Voting on the Cargo Preference Bill: A
Comparison of Simultaneous Models, 36 PUB. CHOICE 301, 301 (1981); Joseph P. Kalt &
Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON.
REV. 279, 280-98 (1984); James B. Kau et al., A General Equilibrium Model of
Congressional Voting, 97 Q.J. ECON. 271, 271 (1982); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Self
Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. & ECON. 365, 365
(1979); James B. Kau & Paul H. Rubin, Voting on Minimum Wages: A Time-Series
Analysis, 86 J. POL. ECON. 337, 337-41 (1978); Steven D. Levitt, How Do Senators Vote?
Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology, 86
AM. ECON. REV. 425, 438 (1996).
11
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for a policy preference into political pressure is the one most likely to achieve
its desired outcome. And this interest group is more often than not likely to
represent industry, rather than consumer, interests. It has long been recognized
that because of industry’s superior efficiency in political organization relative
to consumers, consumer interests are often subservient to industry interests in
the regulatory process. Beyond a certain point, per capita benefits from a
preferred regulatory outcome are diluted such that it becomes irrational to take
part in the political process. A practical consequence of this is that small,
concentrated groups with similar interests – like members of a particular
industry – can organize political support more effectively than large diffuse
groups – like consumers generally. Thus, the equilibrium outcome of the
political process is likely that regulation protects a favored industry from
competition at the expense of consumer welfare.
Politicians seldom present regulation to the public as the political bargain
that it is. Instead, favored industries often claim the mantel of “consumer
protection,” and argue that they need to restrain market forces for the greater
good. These sorts of consumer protection concerns are often raised as a sort of
“trump card” against competition and consumer choice.15 Although some
groups may sincerely offer consumer protection concerns, because special
interest groups often raise them as a fig leaf for their own narrow economic
benefit, they should not necessarily be taken at face value.
Recognition of the competitive dangers of various forms of public
intervention has led to the development of a broad international consensus
among competition agencies about the importance of programs to curb
anticompetitive public policies. In 2003, FTC Chairman Timothy Muris laid
out the rationale for having competition agencies make public restraints a
central focus of their work:
Unless arrested and reversed, the expansion of the zone of immunity . . .
will, by blunting the operation of our antitrust laws in key sectors,
undermine the beneficial economic integration of the nation. The terrain
that antitrust enforcement has gained through decades of strenuous effort
15 Consider the example of unauthorized practice of law (“UPL”) rules that prohibit nonattorneys from handling routine tasks associated with the closing of a residential real estate
transaction. By protecting attorneys from having to compete against non-attorneys, UPL
restrictions raise the prices for legal services. Although proponents of these restrictions tout
their necessity in protecting uninformed consumers, empirical examination shows that these
restrictions provide consumers with no cognizable benefits in terms of increased protection
from fraud or incompetence. But consumers are unlikely to mount a challenge. First, bar
associations often promulgate these rules and state supreme courts adopt them through
processes that only members of the bar – the beneficiaries – are likely have knowledge.
Second, even if consumers become aware that UPL restrictions are being considered, they
would have to expend resources to understand that, despite the rhetoric from the bar
associations, these restrictions are almost certain to harm consumers. Finally, once aware of
the costs associated with a proposed UPL restriction, organizing to fight it would be difficult
given the expense involved and the collective action problems.
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to establish the illegality of private cartels and other forms of
demonstrably anticompetitive conduct will be surrendered at great
economic cost if collusion and exclusion facilitated by government action
become readily available alternatives.16
One year later, Ulf Böge, the President of the German Cartel Office and the
Chair of the Steering Committee of the International Competition Network,
underscored the growing international acceptance of a norm that treats public
restraints as being as hazardous to competition and consumer interests as
private conduct. Böge recognized:
Economic policy researchers have increasingly come to realize, however,
that a large number of these restrictions of competition, if not most, are
not caused by private companies at all. It is rather the governments
themselves which cause damage to consumers and reduce overall
economic welfare due to distortions and restraints of competition
resulting from their laws, regulations or concrete administrative
practice.17
B.

Paradox of Effective Anti-Cartel Enforcement Programs

The past fifteen years have featured general international acceptance among
the world’s competition policy systems of a norm that treats schemes among
direct competitors to set prices, allocate customers, or divide geographic
territories as extremely serious offenses.18 This consensus is reflected in ever
more aggressive efforts within many jurisdictions to detect cartels, prosecute
their members, and punish firms and individuals alike.19 Firms today face
increasingly formidable civil fines, private treble damages, and criminal
punishment if they agree among themselves to set the terms on which they will
do business.
Successful efforts to address private collusive behavior can inspire firms to
seek legislative dispensations from antitrust oversight or to pursue regulatory
measures that place the power of the state behind efforts to forestall entry or
expansion by rival firms. For prospective cartel members, public intervention
that suppresses rivalry has important advantages over purely private collusive
action. Public restraints may confer immunity from antitrust prosecution, and
16

Timothy J. Muris, Looking Forward: The Federal Trade Commission and the Future
Development of U.S. Competition Policy, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 385.
17 Ulf Böge, President, Bundeskartellamt, Speech on the Occasion of the Opening
Session of the Seoul Competition Forum 2004: State-Imposed Restrictions of Competition
and Competition Advocacy 2 (Apr. 20, 2004), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
wEnglisch/download/pdf/04Seoul_e.PDF.
18 Scholars have documented and analyzed this trend in international law. See generally
CRIMINALIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU MEMBER STATES (Katalin J. Cseres et al. eds., 2006).
19 See Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Cartels: Sanctions Against Individuals, 9 J.
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 7, 36-46 (2007) (reviewing enforcement trends).
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such restraints engage the machinery of the state in policing compliance with
commands that set prices, output levels, or terms of entry. A competition
policy that only addresses private restraints will motivate firms to turn away
from private measures and to invest more effort in obtaining state-imposed
restrictions. Without effective means to anticipate, and to discourage
governments from acquiescing in, demands for public restraints, competition
law enforcement merely alters the form of collusive activity and does not
diminish its harmfulness.20
C.

Complexity of the Regulatory Thicket

Many fields of economic regulation present significant levels of complexity.
Examples include regimes governing public procurement at the national, state,
and local levels; controls on land use; and rules determining the manner in
which pharmaceuticals can be introduced into the market. Today’s regulatory
state provides a target rich environment for those willing to invest the effort to
understand the manners in which a regulatory program can be used to hinder
competition. As the Federal Register and other compendia of public
regulations continue to grow, so do opportunities for incumbents to shield
themselves from rivalry that would benefit consumers.
Regulatory complexity has two potentially adverse consequences. First, the
sheer mass and intricacy of regulatory controls give an advantage to larger
incumbent enterprises that have deciphered the regulatory scheme and,
compared to smaller firms or thinly funded new entrants, have more resources
to navigate the regulatory process.21 This condition serves to entrench the
position of significant incumbents, discourage entry, or channel entrepreneurs
into the informal sector of the economy, which affords business operators
fewer protections than they would receive by registering their businesses
through formal incorporation processes.22
The second disadvantage of complexity is that it leaves regulatory systems
prone to gaming and manipulation by sophisticated incumbents. Some firms
use their knowledge of complex systems to pull specific regulatory levers to
forestall actual or potential rivals – for example, by filing objections with

20 See Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 165, 170 (2005) (“Protecting competition by focusing solely on private restraints is
like trying to stop the water flow at a fork in a stream by blocking only one channel. A
system that sends private price fixers to jail, but makes government regulation to fix prices
legal, has not completely addressed the competitive problem. It has simply dictated the
form the problem will take.”).
21 See William E. Kovacic, Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government
Procurement, 25 POL’Y SCI. 29, 34-37 (1992) (discussing how complete regulatory
requirements can discourage entry into public procurement competitions).
22 For the leading treatment of how complexity leads firms to operate informally without
the protection of the law, see HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE
REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 12 (1989).
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regulatory authorities to petitions of newcomers to enter markets. In one
sense, firms using this strategy work within the system by means that do not
violate the law. They invoke governmental process to delay, or otherwise
impose costs on a rival to hinder competition. Certain grocery store chains, for
example, have found this strategy useful in raising Wal-Mart’s costs of entry
into many markets. Incumbent firms have become adroit at invoking
environmental and zoning regulations that require hearings and lengthy
studies. By doing so, such parties have been able to forestall competition from
Wal-Mart. These efforts literally cost consumers in these communities
millions of dollars.23
Other forms of activity use the regulatory state in ways that involve actual
deceit or conduct that contradicts the spirit of a regulatory regime. Such
strategies have been evident in the prescription drug market. For example,
brand name manufactures have found myriad ways in which to block generic
entry by taking advantage of the complexity of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the
FDA’s regulatory scheme. Misrepresenting the nature of patents held on brand
name drugs in required FDA filings can forestall generic entry for over two
years.24 Further, brand name and generic drug makers have taken advantage of
the 180-day exclusivity given to the first generic drug maker to challenge a
branded drug’s patents by entering into reverse-settlement agreements that
allow them to share monopoly profits.25
Competition agencies can provide at least a partial antidote to both
consequences of complexity. They can act as advocates for regulatory
simplification measures that eliminate requirements that discourage entry and
do not impede the attainment of legitimate regulatory objectives.26

23 See R. Michelle Breyer, Turf Wars: Big-Box Legal Battles Focus on Location,
Location, Location, HOME CHANNEL NEWS (National Report), May 19, 2003, available at
2003 WLNR 17143265; Editorial, Public Good: Wal-Mart Shows Government How It’s
Done,
SAN
DIEGO
UNION-TRIB.,
Oct.
3,
2006,
available
at
http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20061003/news_lz1ed3bottom.html;
Mike
Mckee, Small-Town Law, Big-Box Trouble: Wal-Mart Challenges Ordinance Banning
‘Discount Superstores,’ RECORDER (S.F.), Feb. 24, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
25577184.
24 See In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); FED.
TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE 4-5
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/P013518enfperspectNoerrPenningtondoctrine.pdf [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERRPENNINGTON DOCTRINE].
25 See In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig., No. 1:09-MD-2084-TWT (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22,
2010); In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 89 (2003), rev’d, 402
F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 1, Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2008) (No. 08-0244).
26 Robert D. Anderson & William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy and International
Trade Liberalisation: Essential Complements to Ensure Good Performance in Public
Procurement Markets, 18 PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 67, 69 (2009).
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Competition authorities also can use their powers to attack fraud, deception,
and related forms of conduct that attempt to use the regulatory process to
restrict entry or expansion by rival firms.27
D.

Increased Role of Government in the Wake of the Financial Crisis

Since the financial meltdown of 2008, the role of the federal government in
the economy has increased at a rapid rate. Major financial institutions
accepted government TARP money in exchange for an increased government
role in their operations. Similarly, two of the “Big Three” automakers
accepted financial assistance conditioned on greater government involvement
in the industry.28 When government-owned corporations operate in markets,
there is always the temptation to alter the playing field in their favor. For
example, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) competes in parcel post
and expedited delivery markets with FedEx and UPS. Due to the network it
has developed as a result of its government-protected monopoly over letter
carriage and a host of other legal protections it enjoys, however, the USPS’s
presence distorts competition.29 Further, in an attempt to ameliorate the
economic effects of the financial crisis, Congress passed the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act (“ARRA”) of 2009, which contained stringent
“buy American” provisions that apply to certain infrastructure projects funded
by the Act.30 By erecting entry barriers to lower-cost foreign producers, this
provision of the ARRA has proved a windfall to certain domestic concerned
parties, who not coincidentally, lobbied for these provisions.31
The aftermath of the financial crisis has not only directly affected
government involvement in the economy, but in general has fed impulses to
rely less on competition, and more on government dictate, to organize the
27

See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., 140 F.T.C. 123 (2005); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 135
F.T.C. 444 (2003); Biovail Corp., 134 F.T.C. 407 (2002); William E. Kovacic, Rating the
Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903,
911, 913 (2009) (describing FTC cases involving manipulation of government processes).
28 See David E. Sanger, Jeff Zeleny & Bill Vlasic, G.M. Heads to Bankruptcy Protection
as U.S. Steps in: Obama Makes a Bet that the Carmaker Can Recover, N.Y. TIMES, June 1,
2009, at A1; Matthew L. Wald, $2 Billion in Grants to Bolster U.S. Manufacturing of Parts
of Electric Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at B5.
29 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY DIFFERENTLY TO THE
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS 93 (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf.
30 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1605, 123
Stat. 115, 303 (2009). Unlike previous buy-American provisions, those in the ARRA
require one hundred percent American content and apply a hardship exception only if
purchasing from an American source raises the cost of the entire project, as opposed to the
specific component, by twenty-five percent. Id. § 1605(b)(3).
31 Id.; see also Anthony Faiola & Lori Montgomery, Trade Wars Launched with Ruses,
End Runs; Outrage in Canada as U.S. Firms Sever Ties to Obey Stimulus Rules, WASH.
POST, May 15, 2009, at A1.
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economy. These conditions have allowed those who would benefit from
government restrictions on competition to point to the perceived failure of
financial markets adequately to deal with risk as a justification for limiting
competition in their industry. It is not hard to imagine, for example, attorneys
and real estate brokers pointing to the financial crisis as a justification for
requiring consumers to hire an attorney to handle residential real estate
transactions and to restrict the entry of limited-service brokers, respectively.
These and other measures have powerful direct and indirect effects on
competition in the affected industries. Competition agencies have a strong
stake in seeing that competitive distortions are minimized and that what are
depicted as temporary expedients do not become enduring elements of public
policy.
E.

Increased Economic Integration

Throughout the history of the United States, improvements in
communications and transportation have facilitated the integration of the
economies of individual states and have fostered the establishment of a unified
domestic economic market. This was the case, for example, in the
development of rail transport and telegraph communications in the second half
of the nineteenth century. It is ever more the case today as e-commerce
supplies a new means for distant sellers and buyers to transact business.
These technology-driven trends create a greater degree of interdependence
among economic actors who previously operated in what might have seemed
localized markets. In an earlier era, many regulatory controls imposed by
states or municipalities mainly affected the jurisdictions that enacted the
restrictions. For these types of government intervention, spillovers across state
borders may have been negligible. In this context, the political process acted
as a check on anticompetitive state practices. A jurisdiction that imposed
onerous restrictions on its citizens faced the possibility that its citizens,
realizing their comparative disadvantage vis-à-vis other states, would use the
political process to replace public officials who adopted the policies and foster
change in the underlying regulatory controls.
Today a smaller and smaller amount of commerce is truly “local.” For
many products and services, economic integration links firms and customers
located in different states. This gives individual states a greater ability than
they once had to adopt restraints that impose costs on other states and to
protect the interests of firms within their own borders. Greater integration
means that restrictive rules adopted in one state no longer can be assumed to
generate effects only in that state. Spillovers are likely to be more common,
and federalism arguments based on notions of state sovereignty and the local
nature and effects of economic regulation arguably should be reassessed in
light of the larger national interest in promoting a common economic union.
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Distributional Issues

A significant number of state restrictions on competition harm those who are
at the bottom of the economic pyramid.32 Most jurisdictions limit entry into
legal and medical professions under the auspices of assuring certain levels of
quality. No one seriously disputes the need for some form of professional
regulation in the presence of large information asymmetries and serious
spillover effects. In most cases it is difficult, if not impossible, for a consumer
to judge the quality of her physician or attorney, and these practitioners are
unlikely to internalize the full costs of their mistakes. Some level of state
credentialing and regulation makes sense. In other areas, however, the need
for stringent licensing requirements and regulation seems less obvious. For
example, states have restricted entry into providing real estate brokerage and
closing services,33 hair braiding,34 yoga instruction,35 fluoride treatment,36 and
teeth whitening37 under the auspices of protecting the public. A large body of
empirical work has shown that these barriers are likely to lead to higher prices,
reduce consumer choice, and provide few if any consumer benefits in terms of
increased quality. For those in the higher range of income distributions, the
higher prices paid to close a real estate transaction or to have their teeth
whitened may be a minor nuisance. For the poor, the price increases often
mean the difference between having access to a service or not. For example,
recent FTC enforcement and advocacy efforts have targeted attempts to limit
the ability of dental hygienists or mobile dentists to deliver routine dental care
to poor children in South Carolina and Louisiana.38 Fulfillment of these
32

The beneficial distributional effects of competition policy initiatives to curtail stateimposed limits on competition are discussed in William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy,
Consumer Protection, and Economic Disadvantage, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 101, 116
(2007).
33 See, e.g., Competition in Real Estate Brokerage Services, Remarks at the H.R.
Subcomm. on Housing & Community Opportunity (2006) (statement of J. Bruce McDonald,
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/testimony/217299.htm (discussing “the competitive implications of developments
taking place in the real estate brokerage marketplace”).
34 Mike Devaney, Winners and Losers in the Preference Game, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Oct. 20, 1998, at B7, available at 1998 WLNR 903064 (“Sabrina Reese, who
owns two African hair-braiding salons in Los Angeles, dropped out of cosmetology school
because hair braiding wasn’t covered in class or on the licensing exam. She currently faces
a one-year jail term for ‘practicing cosmetology without a license.’”); Hair Braiders Won’t
Need License, DULUTH NEWS TRIB., June 16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 22918441.
35 Dan Walters, Professionals and Politics, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, May 17, 1994, at A3,
available at 1994 WLNR 4729348.
36 See S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 138 F.T.C. 229, 230-31 (2004).
37 See, e.g., Mall Teeth-Whitening Business Shut Down, WYFF NEWS 4 (Greenville,
S.C.), Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://www.wyff4.com/news/15446468/detail.html.
38 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2008: A FORCE FOR CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION
16 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/03/ChairmansReport2008.pdf.
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regulatory schemes would have reduced the number of students who received
dental care at all.
Not only do these barriers make purchasing certain services more expensive,
but they also eliminate yet another option to earn a living for those who
already have so few. Vocations involving health and beauty services, such as
hair styling, teeth whitening, or exercise instruction require little formal
training and can provide a relatively quick path for those with entrepreneurial
DNA to work their way out of conditions of poverty. Additionally, such
restrictions on competition have both macro and micro implications. At the
macro level, robust competition is associated with higher incomes more
generally; programs that curb public restraints on competition are likely to
reduce poverty. At a more personal, micro level, these restraints not only
reduce income but also the less quantifiable personal satisfaction that comes
from being able to engage in the process of earning a living.
II.

THE CURRENT U.S. TOOLKIT

The U.S. competition policy system provides some means for government
agencies and private litigants to challenge government restraints on
competition. On the whole, these measures supply relatively weak constraints,
especially when compared to the powers available to a number of foreign
authorities. Despite their limitations, the application of these tools has
provided a useful curb upon some forms of public intervention and upon
private parties who seek to invoke the protection of the state.
A.

Limits to Enforcement

In the United States, the Supreme Court has crafted two judicial doctrines
that greatly hamper the ability of the antitrust laws to deter state-imposed
competition restraints. First, out of respect for federalism, restraints imposed
directly by the state sovereign – a state legislature or a state supreme court,
acting in a legislative capacity – are protected from antitrust challenge under
the state action doctrine.39 Further, the state action doctrine may shield actions
taken by subsidiary government entities and by private parties in some
circumstances. Guided by First Amendment concerns, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine prevents agencies from bringing actions against parties for the
anticompetitive effects of state action they urge.40
39

See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352-53 (1943) (creating the state action doctrine);
see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) (“[W]hen a state legislature adopts
legislation, its actions constitute those of the State . . . and ipso facto are exempt from the
operation of the antitrust laws.” (citations omitted)). The Court also extended this ipso facto
exemption to a state supreme court acting in a legislative capacity. Id. at 568.
40 The doctrine takes its name from the first two cases that the Supreme Court considered
in this jurisprudential line. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
670 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136
(1961). For a detailed exposition of some of the issues presented by the Noerr-Pennington
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State Action Doctrine

Since 1943, through what has come to be known as the “state action
doctrine,” the Supreme Court has limited the ability of the federal antitrust
laws to reach into state affairs. At its core, the state action doctrine allows
federal courts to examine only the pedigree and the process governing a state
regulatory regime, not its substantive effect on the economy.41 Thus,
anticompetitive state regulation is allowed to stand as long as the court is
satisfied that the restraint in question is truly state action. States can avail
themselves of state action immunity to defend Supremacy Clause challenges to
the constitutionality of anticompetitive regulatory schemes. Private parties and
non-sovereign elements of state government entities also can take advantage of
state action immunity to defend antitrust suits when they are acting under color
of state law. Below we discuss in more detail the metes and bounds of this
complex area of law.
a.

Preemption

At its core, the state action doctrine is about federalism. It attempts to
resolve the extent to which a state, in a system of dual sovereigns, can pursue
policies that conflict with the national policy in favor of competition. Under
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence, a court can invalidate a state law in three
circumstances: when (1) Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) the
scheme of federal regulation is such that it is reasonable to infer that Congress
has “left no room” for states to regulate; or (3) there is a direct conflict
between state and federal regulatory action so that either “compliance with
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” or “state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”42 In the case of the interplay between state
economic regulation and the federal antitrust laws, it is clear that (1) and (2) do
not apply: there is no express preemption of anticompetitive state regulation in
federal antitrust laws, and Congress left room for states to regulate
anticompetitive behavior by explicitly allowing for state enforcement of the
antitrust laws.43 Thus, any Supremacy clause challenge to a state regulatory
doctrine, see ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE, supra note
24, at 16-36.
41 See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
42 Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
43 This point highlights how antitrust preemption comes about in a different setting than
most preemption settings. Preemption analysis often involves the reconciliation of differing
federal and state standards that address the same concerns. For example, there is a robust
debate as to whether the federal health privacy regime (HIPAA) should trump inconsistent
state privacy regimes. See James C. Cooper & Daniel J. Gilman, There Is a Time to Keep
Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard Part Is Knowing Which Is Which: Striking the Balance
Between Privacy Protection and the Flow of Health Care Information, 16 MICH.
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regime must argue that compliance with the state regime results in an antitrust
violation or that the regime conflicts with the “full purpose” of the antitrust
laws.
When preemption is based on a state-federal conflict argument,
Congressional intent is necessarily the touchstone of any analysis;44 before a
court can determine the extent of any conflict, it must be able to discern how
far Congress intended the law in question to reach into state affairs. The courts
have said at various times that the antitrust laws express a national policy in
favor of competition45 and that Congress acted to the fullest extent of its
commerce powers when enacting the antitrust laws.46 Thus, at first blush one

TELECOMM. & TECH. L. Rev. 279 (2010). The analog in the antitrust context would be
whether state antitrust laws can survive when they differ from federal standards. See
California v. Atl. Richfield of Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 (1989) (reconciling state and
federal antitrust laws with respect to state legislation allowing indirect purchasers to have
antitrust standing and holding that the federal antitrust laws supplement, rather than
supplant, state antitrust laws). In the context of state action preemption, the issue is: to what
extent can a state law promote anticompetitive conduct before it is preempted? That is,
unlike the typical preemption case, in the state action context state and federal laws are at
cross purposes – the federal regime is designed to root out anticompetitive conduct while the
state regime purposely displaces competition in pursuit of a competing goal.
44 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194 (“[W]e ‘start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (internal citations omitted)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1996) (“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in
every pre-emption case . . . . As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption
statute must rest primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose.’” (quoting
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 530, n. 27 (1992))).
45 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws in general,
and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill
of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete – to
assert with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster. Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to
one sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe that such
foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more important sector of the
economy.”); see also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695
(1978) (“‘The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition.’” (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951))); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (observing that “the law
encourages [the plaintiff’s] suit to further the overriding public policy in favor of
competition”); United States v. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc., 672 F.2d 469, 481
(5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]here is the strong policy in favor of competition that underlies the
federal antitrust laws.”).
46 See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); In re W. Liquid
Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202, 204 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Chrysler Corp. Parts
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may think that anticompetitive state laws would easily fall when pitted against
the national competition laws. When the Court first addressed the question
head on, however, it reached the opposite result. In Parker v. Brown,47 a case
involving a preemption challenge to a California regulatory scheme that set up
a raisin cartel, the Court resolved the question of conflict by finding none.48 It
interpreted the Sherman Act in light of the federal system of dual sovereignty
to urge an abundance of caution when attributing to Congress intent to nullify a
state regulatory regime.49 Within this framework, the Court held that “nothing
in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history . . . suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature.”50 Rather, the Sherman act is directed against “individual
and not state action.”51 Thus, regardless of anticompetitive impact or intent,
the antitrust laws cannot strike down state action that supplants competition
with regulation. This has remained a bedrock principle in subsequent cases.52
The Court’s holding in Parker must be seen in historical context. The Court
had only recently engaged in a jurisprudential revolution, rebuking decades of
holdings that struck down state regulatory schemes on the grounds that they
interfered with economic liberties.53 As others have noted, Parker then can be
seen as a necessary concession to anticompetitive state regulation to avoid a
return to the Lochner era.54 Modern antitrust – with its focus on consumer
welfare – and economic due process look very much the same. Once the
federal judiciary got out of the business of second-guessing the wisdom of
states’ economic regulation under substantive due process analysis, it could
hardly reopen this line of attack under the guise of antitrust. Parker prevented
this outcome. Consistent with the post-Lochner rejection of economic
substantive due process, the Supreme Court made clear in Parker that state

Wholesalers, Nw. Region, 180 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1950) (holding that when enacting
the Sherman Act, Congress exercised the full extent of its commerce power).
47 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
48 Id. at 344-45, 351.
49 Id. at 351.
50 Id. at 350-51.
51 Id. at 352.
52 E.g., Rice v. Norman, 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 110-11 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S.
117, 133 (1978).
53 See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 243 (1941); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934).
54 See Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the
Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 499-501 (1987); William H. Page, Antitrust,
Federalism, and the Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action
Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61 B.U. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (1981); Paul R. Verkuil,
State Action, Due Process and Antitrust: Reflections on Parker v. Brown, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 328, 331 (1975).
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laws will not be preempted by federal antitrust laws merely because they have
an anticompetitive effect.55
Although the Supreme Court has never expressed this concession directly, it
is telling that in the two antitrust preemption cases that also included due
process challenges, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,56 and New Motor
Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,57 the Court mustered similar
arguments to deal with both claims. For example, in Exxon, the Court quickly
rejected the substantive due process objection to Maryland’s scheme,
explaining that although the evidence may cast doubt on the law’s wisdom,
“the Due Process Clause does not empower the judiciary to sit as a
superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation.”58 It concluded that
“[r]egardless of the ultimate economic efficiency of the statue, we have no
hesitancy in concluding that it bears a reasonable relation to the State’s
legitimate purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market.”59 Turning to the
antitrust preemption challenge, the Court held that the mere fact that the
Maryland divorcement regulation is likely to be anticompetitive, and thus “in
this sense, there is a conflict between the statute and the central policy of the
Sherman Act,” is an insufficient reason to strike it down, “[f]or if an adverse
effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute
invalid, the States’ power to engage in economic regulation would be
effectively destroyed.”60 Similarly, in Orrin W. Fox, the Court addressed a due
process challenge by pointing to states’ broad power to engage in economic

55

Parker, 317 U.S. at 351-52. Merrick Garland, currently a member of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, has argued that because the Supreme Court
rejected “the Lochner-era doctrine of substantive due process, under which federal courts
struck down economic regulations they viewed as unreasonably interfering with the liberty
of contract,” it could not “resurrect Lochner in the garb of the Sherman Act.” Garland,
supra note 54, at 499-500; see also Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control
Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 565 (1st Cir. 1999) (“To allow federal judges to decide which of
these legislative enactments should survive and which should be condemned comes close to
reintroducing the kind of judgments that got the Supreme Court into so much trouble in the
Lochner era.”). Further, when there is a pre-legislative history of state regulation in a field,
there is a presumption against finding congressional intent to preempt. This presumption is
relevant in the state action area, because, as the Court’s post-Lochner cases make
painstakingly clear, the states have a long history of exercising their police powers to
restrain competition for the sake of public health and safety. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 52530 (collecting cases).
56 437 U.S. at 133.
57 439 U.S. at 110-11.
58 Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 124 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
59 Id. at 124-25.
60 Id. at 133.
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regulation, and quoted language from Exxon to hold that to allow an antitrust
challenge to anticompetitive state regulation would eviscerate this power.61
The clear conflict necessary for preemption does not exist when states
directly undertake regulatory schemes, as it does in the case of wage or rent
controls, but it may exist when it delegates its regulatory authority to private
entities.62 As the Court explained in Parker, a state cannot shield illegal
conduct from the Sherman Act by “by authorizing them to violate it, or by
declaring that their action is lawful.”63 The Court famously expanded on this
point nearly thirty years later in Midcal, when it said that the state cannot save
a regulatory scheme from preemption by placing a “gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.”64 In
the antitrust preemption context, these comments have come to mean that the
conflict necessary to condemn a state regulatory regime in the abstract can be
found only when it “mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily
constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible
pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with
the statute.”65 Only conduct that constitutes a per se violation will “constitute[]
a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases,” so state laws compelling conduct
that would be judged under the rule of reason – such as a statute authorizing
exclusive dealing, exclusive territories, or resale price maintenance – do not
qualify for preemption.66 On the other hand, a statute mandating, authorizing,
or placing “irresistible pressure” on private entities to engage in actions that
constitute per se violations – e.g., naked horizontal price fixing and market
allocation agreements – would be subject to preemption.67
To deal with instances where the parties have formed no agreement, which
is necessary to satisfy the plurality requirement of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the Supreme Court has developed the concept of “hybrid restraints.”68
Hybrid restraints are regulations that allow private parties to compel adherence
to an anticompetitive agreement. This concept arose in the context of cases
involving laws that forced alcohol wholesalers to sell at prices set by

61

Orrin W. Fox, 439 U.S. at 106-07, 111 (1978). Dissenting in City of Boulder, Justice
Rehnquist made a closer connection between antitrust and due process analysis, arguing that
to subject municipalities to rule of reason claims would lead to the type of judicial
micromanagement of state affairs that the Court repudiated in cases like Nebbia and West.
Cmty. Commc’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
62 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 268 (1986). What constitutes a private
entity for state action purposes is an area of some contention. See infra Part II.A.1.b.
63 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
64 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980).
65 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).
66 See id.
67 See id.; see also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.8 (1987).
68 E.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267-68 (1986).
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producers.69 Because these regulations in effect allowed upstream suppliers to
set downstream prices, the Court analogized them to resale price maintenance
agreements, which were at the time per se illegal.70 Hybrid restraints are to be
contrasted with “unilateral” restraints, which involve the state directly dictating
a market outcome, such as the rent control ordinance at issue in Fisher v.
Berkeley. The application of the hybrid restraint doctrine to laws that facilitate
cartel behavior by requiring posting and holding of prices, has led to a great
deal of confusion among lower courts.71
Even if regulation authorizes conduct that would otherwise be per se illegal
under the antitrust laws, it can still be saved from preemption if the state
engages in sufficient oversight to convert private conduct into state action.72
Thus, the antitrust laws reach only those state laws that permit or compel
private entities to engage in unsupervised conduct that otherwise would result
in per se illegal conduct.73 Although the required content of active supervision
69 See, e.g., Rice, 458 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., concurring); 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S.
at 345 n.8.
70 For example, in State Oil v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997), the Supreme Court held that
maximum resale price maintenance agreements were no longer per se illegal under the
Sherman Act. Ten years later, in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 908 (2007), the Supreme Court held that minimum resale price maintenance
agreements were no longer per se illegal, and instead courts must use a circumstancespecific “rule of reason.” Id.
71 Compare, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 894 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding state regulation that required beer and wine wholesalers to post prices and adhere
to them for thirty days to be a hybrid restraint and therefore subject to preemption by the
Sherman Act), and TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 213 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
Maryland liquor regulation that required wholesalers to post and adhere to prices and
prohibited volume discounts to be a hybrid restraint), with Mass. Food Ass’n v. Mass.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 565-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that
there are no private restraints “operating alone or in conjunction with state action” where a
state statute limited licenses to three per company), and Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 745 F.2d. 166, 176 (2d Cir. 1984) (reasoning that there is a “grave question” whether
a state regulation requiring wholesalers to post and maintain schedules of prices and
discounts is enough to be a policy “actively supervised” by the state). See infra notes 17580 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion.
72
See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988) (reasoning that active supervision
necessary to assure that private conduct “actually further state regulatory policies”).
73 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 104
(1980); Rice, 458 U.S. at 661; Mass. Food Ass’n, 197 F.3d at 563-64 (“It is one thing to say
that a state may itself regulate in an ‘anticompetitive’ fashion; it is quite another to say that
the state can effectively exempt private parties from obeying the antitrust laws.”). See also
Garland, supra note 54, at 500, who observed:
On the one hand, the Court did not believe Congress had intended the Sherman Act to
“nullify” a state’s regulation of its own economy; on the other hand, it was equally sure
that Congress would not have permitted a state to nullify the Sherman Act itself by
“authorizing” private parties “to violate” the Act “or by declaring that their action is
lawful.”
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remains hazy,74 mere state authorization and enforcement of a private scheme
will not suffice. Rather, the state involvement must involve a “pointed
reexamination” of the conduct at issue,75 sufficient to ensure that the state is
“exerci[sing] ultimate control.”76
The active supervision requirement has two rationales. The first is explicit:
the requirement seeks to assure political accountability.77 By actively
supervising a price fixing scheme, state involvement will come into sharper
focus. As the Court explained in Ticor:
States must accept political responsibility for actions they intend to
undertake. . . . Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to
obscure it. Neither federalism nor political responsibility is well served
by a rule that essential national policies are displaced by state regulations
intended to achieve more limited ends. For States which do choose to
displace the free market with regulation, our insistence on real
compliance with both parts of the Midcal test will serve to make clear that
the State is responsible for the price fixing that it has sanctioned and
undertaken to control.78
This sort of state “ownership” will help provide assurance that anticompetitive
market outcomes are the result of deliberate state policy rather than merely
private agreements.79
The second rationale is implicit. The requirement of active supervision
raises the costs to states to implement anticompetitive programs, and costs to
private parties who stand to benefit from such programs.80 For example, a
state may no longer merely pass a law that allows attorneys to set “reasonable”
fees for real estate closings.81 Rather, if the state desires regulation in this area,
it must expend scarce resources to set up a regulatory regime that will examine
the “reasonableness” of the prices private upon which the attorneys agree.82
The attorneys, who desired the regulation, are also worse off. Their proposed
fees must undergo regulatory scrutiny, which probably reduces the scope for
rent extraction and also imposes costs associated with navigating the

74

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION
TASK FORCE 22-24 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf.
75 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106.
76 Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
77 FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992).
78 Id.
79 See id. at 634; Patrick, 486 U.S. at 106.
80 See Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77, 119-20
(2006) (arguing that the state must incur “public costs” to supervise a price setting regime).
81 See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638-39.
82 See id. at 644-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

2010]

U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NORMS

1575

regulatory landscape. It also increases litigation risk for both the state and
private parties subject to the regulatory scheme.83
Although the active supervision requirement places strictures on state
regulation, the Court has been clear that this requirement is about process
rather than substance. Active supervision is not an alternative way to reach a
Lochner-like outcome. As promised in Ticor, “the purpose of the active
supervision inquiry is not to determine whether the State has met some
normative standard, such as efficiency, in its regulatory practices,” but rather
“to determine whether the State has exercised sufficient independent judgment
and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been established as a
product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement among
private parties.”84
b.

State Action Immunity for Non-Sovereign Actors

The discussion thus far has concerned challenges to the constitutionality of
state regulatory regimes. Often, however, private parties acting pursuant to a
state regulatory regime are the target of antitrust suits that do not necessarily
seek to invalidate the state law. These non-sovereign entities also can use the
state action doctrine as a shield to avoid antitrust liability. Consistent with the
preemption jurisprudence, private parties can avail themselves of this
immunity if they can show that they are (1) acting pursuant to a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state intent to displace competition with
a regulatory scheme; and (2) actively supervised by the state.85 As noted
above in the context of preemption, the rationale behind these requirements for
immunity is that they provide the reviewing court with some assurance that the
state has taken political ownership of the anticompetitive consequences
flowing from the conduct at issue.86
The Supreme Court has said that municipalities, although not the sovereign,
are also not private parties, and consequently are subject only to the clear
articulation prong.87 The treatment of non-sovereign subsidiaries of the state –
such as regulatory boards or rate-setting commissions – remains unclear.
Anticompetitive regulation promulgated by such boards that does not hew to a
clear state policy is not immune from antitrust challenge.88 The extent to
which these non-sovereign governmental entities need active supervision by
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See id. at 647 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 634-35 (majority opinion).
85 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
86 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
87 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985).
88 For a regulatory board to satisfy the clear articulation standard it must both have the
authority to regulate and be acting pursuant to an “authority to suppress competition” that is
the “foreseeable result” of a clearly articulated state policy. City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1991).
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some arm of the state is unsettled law.89 The Court has never directly weighed
in on the treatment of other subsidiary state instrumentalities, but has hinted at
least twice in dictum that state agencies are not private actors.90 In Town of
Hallie, where the Court held that the active supervision requirement does not
apply to municipalities, it further stated that “[i]n cases in which the actor is a
state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also not be
required, although we do not here decide that issue.”91 In City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., moreover, the Court rejected petitioner’s
argument that Goldfarb applied only to private parties because “the State Bar,
although a state agency by law acting in its official capacity, was somehow not
a state agency because its official actions in issuing ethical opinions . . .
benefited its member-lawyers by discouraging price competition.”92 The Court
responded: “We think it obvious that the fact that the ancillary effect of the
State Bar’s policy, or even the conscious desire on its part, may have been to
benefit the lawyers it regulated cannot transmute the State Bar’s official
actions into those of a private organization.”93
At the same time, there are some appeals court decisions that suggest boards
comprised of financially interested parties are private parties for state action
purposes. For example, in Washington State Electrical Contractors Ass’n v.
Forrest, the Ninth Circuit held that a state “apprenticeship council,” which was
89 Compare Hass v. Or. State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453, 1461 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that
“that the Bar, as an agency of the State of Oregon, need not satisfy the ‘active supervision’
requirement to qualify for protection under the state action exemption”), and Town of
Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that the
active state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that
issue.”), with Crosby v. Hosp. Auth. of Valdosta & Lowndes Cnty., 93 F.3d 1515, 1524
(11th Cir. 1996) (focusing on “whether the nexus between the State and the [agency in
question] is sufficiently strong that there is little danger that the [agency] is involved in”
private anticompetitive action”), and Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. Forrest, 930
F.2d. 736, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding apprenticeship council could qualify as a state
agency only if “the anticompetitive activity [is] supervised by the state itself”); FTC v.
Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1987).
90 See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62-63
(1985) (stating that a public utility commission not the “State itself”); Hoover v. Ronwin,
466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (“Closer analysis is required when the activity at issue is not
directly that of the legislature or supreme court, but is carried out by others pursuant to state
authorization.”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789-90 (1975) (reasoning that
attorney fee schedule established by county bar association was not immune from antitrust
liability as the bar association was not a state agency); see also REPORT OF THE STATE
ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 74, at 23-32 (analyzing state action immunity doctrine, and
reasoning that “[a]t its core, the active supervision requirement serves to identify those
responsible for public policy decisions”).
91 Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10.
92 City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 n.41 (1978) (internal
citations omitted).
93 Id. at 413.
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established by statute and makes and enforce minimum wage rates for
apprentices performing electrical contracts in Washington, was subject to the
active supervision requirement.94 Noting that the council has “both public and
private members, and the private members have their own agenda which may
or may not be responsive to state labor policy,” the court remanded the case to
the district court to “make specific findings and conclusions on both prongs”
of Midcal.95 Federal Trade Commission v. Monahan concerned an appeal of
an order to enforce an FTC subpoena on the grounds that the challenged
activity – pharmacy board rules that restricted advertising and location of
pharmacy branch locations – was immune under Parker.96 The court upheld
the order to enforce the subpoena, noting that “where state regulation by a
private party is involved and where there is a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over what essentially is private anticompetitive activity, . . . the state, in order
to obtain antitrust immunity, must supervise actively the activity in
question.”97 The court went on to acknowledge that the Board, although a state
agency, may be engaged in activities that “are ‘essentially’ those of private
parties,” and that relevant to this inquiry was “how the Board functions in
practice, and perhaps . . . the role played by its members who are private
pharmacists.”98
This uncertainty is troubling because non-sovereign entities are responsible
for so much anticompetitive regulation, usually under the guise of consumer
protection.99 Regulatory boards often can point to legislation that provides
authority for their conduct making litigation based solely on a lack of “clear
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Forrest, 930 F.2d. at 737.
Id. (emphasis added).
96 FTC v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1987).
97 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
98 Id. at 690.
99 For example, state dental boards, typically made up of practicing dentists, have
promulgated regulations to limit competition from dental hygienists. See S.C. State Bd. of
Dentistry, No. 9311, 2007 WL 2763994 (F.T.C.) (Sep. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9311/070911decision.pdf; Letter from FTC Staff to La. State
Rep. Timothy Burns 5-6 (May 1, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/05/
V090009louisianadentistry.pdf. Real estate boards, comprised of practicing real estate
agents, have attempted to promulgate regulations to restrict limited service brokers and
other novel business models. See, e.g., United States v. Kentucky Real Estate Comm’n,
Competitive Impact Statement, 70 Fed. Reg. 45424-25 (Aug. 5, 2005); Letter from FTC &
DOJ Staff to Loretta DeHay, Gen. Counsel, Tex. Real Estate Comm’n 1 (Apr. 20, 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/04/050420ftcdojtexasletter.pdf. Additionally, state bar ethics
committees, comprised of practicing attorneys, have issued ethics opinions that limit the
provision of online legal services and attorney advertising. See, e.g., Letter from FTC Staff
to John Glancy, Chairman, Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex. 1 (May 26, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/05/V060017CommentsonaRequestforAnEthicsOpinionImage.p
df; Letter from FTC Staff to Elizabeth Clark Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Florida Bar 1 (Mar.
23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/be/V070002.pdf; supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
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articulation” risky in most cases.100 Absent an active supervision requirement,
much of this conduct effectively will remain beyond the reach of antitrust laws,
and thus largely undeterred.
2.

Noerr-Pennington

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine takes its name from two cases in which the
Supreme Court first attempted to interpret the Sherman Act in light of the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress.101 Since these early
cases, the Supreme Court has revisited the issue a handful of times. Taken
together, these holdings sketch out a general rule that legitimate attempts to
secure government action – legislative, regulatory, and judicial – are immune
from antitrust scrutiny.102
The Noerr doctrine rests on the primary principle of the right of citizens
under the First Amendment to urge government action. In Eastern Railroad
Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the Supreme Court
stressed the “essential dissimilarity” between concerted lobbying of the
government to act and the type of agreements that the Sherman Act typically
confronts, such as price fixing, boycotts, and market divisions.103 The Court
bolstered its interpretation that the Sherman Act does not reach the type of
conduct at issue by noting that to conclude otherwise “would raise important
constitutional questions. The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected
by the Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an
intent to invade these freedoms.”104 More recently, the Court in both Federal
Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n105 and Professional
Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.106 has noted
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But see S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, No. 9311, 2007 WL 2763994 (F.T.C.) (Sep. 11,
2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9311/070911decision.pdf.
101 See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E. R.R.
Presidents’ Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961). The Court
has always been careful to frame its Noerr-Pennington inquiries as ones of Sherman Act
interpretation rather than resolution of a conflict between the First Amendment and the
Sherman Act. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.
(PREI), 508 U.S. 49, 57 (1993); FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411,
431-32 (1990); Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38.
102 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988).
103 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
104 Id. at 137-38.
105 Superior Court Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 424 (stating that the Court in Noerr was
“[i]nterpreting the Sherman Act in the light of the First Amendment’s Petition Clause”).
106 PREI, 508 U.S. at 56 (arguing that the Court in Noerr interpreted the Sherman Act, in
part, to avoid imputing “‘to Congress an intent to invade’ the First Amendment right to
petition”).
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that the interpretation of the Sherman Act in Noerr rests on a desire to avoid
conflict with the right to petition.107
The rationale for Noerr also can be traced to other sources. For example, in
Noerr the Court expressed concern that a rule limiting citizens’ right to petition
their government for anticompetitive rules may hinder governmental decisionmaking, noting that “to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation
depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their
representatives.”108 Subjecting legitimate lobbying to antitrust scrutiny would
deter this valuable conduct and hence “would substantially impair the power of
government to take actions through its legislature and executive that operate to
restraint trade.”109 The Supreme Court has echoed this basis for protecting
certain petitioning activity in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited110 and Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc.111
The Court also has hinted that federalism concerns may underpin Noerr
doctrine, at least when the case involves petitioning a state government. For
example, citing Parker v. Brown,112 the Court explained in Noerr:
To hold that the government retains the power to act in this representative
capacity and yet hold, at the same time, that the people cannot freely
inform the government of their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act
a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a

107 The recent application of Noerr principles to the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) provides additional insight into the role that the First Amendment plays in
defining the scope of Noerr protection. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516,
524 (2001). As in Noerr, the Court in BE & K turned to statutory construction to avoid the
constitutional question, holding that the NLRB’s standard was invalid because there was
nothing in the relevant statutory text to suggest that it “must be read to reach all reasonably
based but unsuccessful suits filed with a retaliatory purpose.” Id. at 536. In light of the BE
& K decision, the Ninth Circuit recently concluded that the Noerr doctrine “stands for a
generic rule of statutory construction, applicable to any statutory interpretation that could
implicate the rights protected by the Petition Clause.” Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d
923, 931 (9th Cir. 2006); see also BE & K, 536 U.S. at 536 (“Under the Noerr-Pennington
rule of statutory construction, we must construe federal statutes so as to avoid burdening
conduct that implicates the protections afforded by the Petition Clause unless the statute
clearly provides otherwise.”).
108 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
109 Id.
110 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
111 508 U.S. at 56 (“In light of the government’s ‘power to act in [its] representative
capacity’ and ‘to take actions . . . that operate to restrain trade,’ we reasoned that the
Sherman Act does not punish ‘political activity through’ which ‘the people . . . freely inform
the government of their wishes.’” (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137)).
112 317 U.S. 341 (1943).

1580

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1555

purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of
that Act.113
Years later, the Supreme Court expanded on this notion in Omni, explaining
that “Parker and Noerr are complementary expressions of the principle that the
antitrust laws regulate business, not politics; the former decision protects the
States’ acts of governing, and the latter the citizens’ participation in
government.”114
There are exceptions to Noerr’s general rule of petitioning immunity. First,
as the Court explained in Noerr, the antitrust laws would apply to petitioning
that although “ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a
mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”115 Over the years, the
Court has refined the definition of sham, anchoring it in the concept of
“genuineness”; genuine attempts to secure governmental action are immune,
but mere attempts to use the governmental process, as opposed to the outcome
of that process, are not shielded from the antitrust laws. Given the value that
the Court has placed on First Amendment petitioning relative to competition,
however, the evidentiary burdens to show such “sham petitioning” are
formidable. The Court has held that “genuine” has both objective and
subjective components: plaintiffs must first make a showing that petitioning is
“objectively baseless” before they can delve into the issue of whether the
defendant’s petitioning was subjectively motivated to use the process to harm
competition.116 At least in the context of a single lawsuit, the Supreme Court
has held that a suit is objectively baseless when no reasonable litigant could
expect success on the merits.117
As we discuss in more detail in Part IV, the extent to which deceptive
petitioning is protected remains unclear. The Court has held that patents
procured by fraud are not protected from antitrust suits, but has never
considered whether a more general misrepresentation exception to Noerr
exists. Several lower courts, however, have held that attempts to procure
favorable government action by fraud are not immune.118 Drawing on dicta in
Allied Tube, which states that the degree of immunity should vary by the
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Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1990).
115 Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
116 PREI, 508 U.S. at 56, 60 (outlining a two part definition of sham litigation which,
under the Noerr doctrine, is excepted from immunity because such petitioning activity is a
mere shame to cover an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor).
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998); St. Joseph’s
Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F. 2d 948 (11th Cir. 1986); Israel v. Baxter Labs.,
Inc., 466 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co.
of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
114
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“nature and context” of the petitioning,119 these courts appear to have limited
this exception to Noerr to instances involving adjudication rather than
lobbying.120 Some lower courts also have crafted an exception to Noerr for
petitions that seek only a ministerial response – that is, a response that is
automatic and thus requires no government deliberation. The underlying
rationale for this exception is that requests for ministerial action do not involve
petitioning in the first place, and thus do not implicate the First Amendment.121
B.

The Power of Persuasion: Competition Advocacy in the United States

The economic theory of regulation posits that because of relatively high
organizational and transaction costs, consumers will be disadvantaged relative
to businesses in securing favorable regulation.122 This situation tends to result
in regulations – such as unauthorized practice of law rules or minimum-service
requirements for real estate brokers – that protect certain industries from
competition at the expense of consumers. Given the strictures imposed by the
state action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines, this conduct is often beyond the
reach of the antitrust laws.
Broadly, through competition advocacy, the FTC and the DOJ (the
“Agencies”) can use their expertise to persuade government entities to adopt
policies that further (or at least do not impede) competition. Competition
advocacy often takes the form of letters to interested regulators, but also
consists of formal submissions, testimony, amicus curiae briefs, studies,
reports, and informal discussions. By contrast, with the state action doctrine
strictures that force competition agencies to focus only on process when using
the antitrust laws to block a state restraint, advocacy focuses almost solely on
the substance of the restraint at hand. Most advocacy comments, for example,
argue that because the Supreme Court has declared that the antitrust laws
represent a national policy in favor of competition, the burden should rest on a
state to justify restraints based on a market failure, and then to craft them only
so broadly as necessary to achieve the competing public goal.123

119

Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1987).
See FTC, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE (2006)
[hereinafter NOERR-PENNINGTON REPORT].
121 See In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding
that when deciding whether to extend Noerr-Pennington immunity to acts through which
private parties seek to influence governmental decisions, it is critical to distinguish between
activities in which the decision maker acts “only after an independent review of the merits
of a petition,” and those in which the decision maker acts “in a merely ministerial or nondiscretionary capacity in direct reliance on the representations made by private parties”).
122 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR.,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 313-35 (3d ed. 2000).
123 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Federal Trade Commission and the United States
of America at 9, McMahon v. Advanced Title Services Co. of W. Va., 607 S.E.2d 519 (W.
Va. 2004) (No. 31706), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040017.pdf.
120
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Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by
acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not
restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale
for imposing such costs on citizens.124 By representing consumer interests in
the regulatory process, the Agencies can affect outcomes in different ways.
First, and most directly, advocacy can persuade a decision-maker to oppose
regulation by presenting a compelling case that it restricts competition more
than is necessary to promote some consumer protection goal, and therefore is
not in the public interest. At the same time, competitive advocacy can provide
reasoned explanations that will help the decision-maker justify the decision to
the public. Second, to the extent that a comment informs the public of the way
a proposed regulation is likely to affect them, it can spur political action, and
thus increase the political costs associated with supporting anticompetitive
regulation. In this manner, competition advocacy can move the political
equilibrium toward one that is more favorable to competition. Finally,
advocacy can provide “political cover” for public-spirited politicians seeking
to benefit consumers but opposed by a powerful industry; regardless of
whether a comment increases the political cost of supporting anticompetitive
regulations, a politician can hide behind it as an excuse for not supporting a
favored industry.
The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to
which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers
of those improved outcomes. For all practical purposes, however, both
elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty. There have
been two formal attempts to measure the effectiveness of competition
advocacy in the United States. One study that assessed the advocacy
program’s impact on regulatory outcomes between 1987-1989 and found that
40% of comment recipients reported that the comments were at least
“moderately effective,” meaning that “the governmental entity’s actions were
totally or in large part consistent with at least some of the FTC’s
recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of
those recommendations.”125 The author concedes, however, that this “does not

124 As the 1989 “Kirkpatrick Report” observes:
The FTC’s competition advocacy program permits it to accomplish for consumers what
prohibitive costs prevent them from tackling individually. It is the potential for the
FTC to undo governmentally imposed restraints that lessen consumer welfare, and to
prevent their imposition, that warrants the program’s continuance and expansion.
Because ill-advised governmental restraints can impose staggering costs on consumers,
the potential benefits from an advocacy program exceed the Commission’s entire
budget.
Report of the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, Special Committee to
Study the Role of Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 94 (1989).
125 Arnold C. Celnicker, The Federal Trade Commission’s Competition and Consumer
Advocacy Program, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 379, 391 (1989). Another 11% of the survey
respondents found the comments to be “slightly effective,” meaning that “the governmental
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establish that the FTC’s effect on those decisions improved them; that is what
cannot be measured.”126 More recently, the FTC conducted a survey of
advocacy recipients and sponsors of bills or regulation that the FTC opposed
from 2001-2006.127 The study found that 53% of respondents agreed that the
outcome of the regulatory process was largely consistent with the FTC
position, and 54% of respondents (and 79% of those respondents who had an
opinion) believed that the FTC comment influenced the outcome. Further,
81% of respondents responded that the fact that the comment came from the
FTC caused them to give it more weight than they otherwise would.
Although advocacy can play an important role in reducing government
restraints on competition, it has some serious shortcomings. First, and perhaps
most importantly, advocacy can only inform the debate and suggest
appropriate action; it cannot compel that action in the same manner as a
tribunal. Although advocacy can argue that states should not pursue policies
that undermine the national policy of competition without sufficient
empirically based justification, the antitrust preemption doctrine in its current
form makes this line of argument a legal fiction: that the Supreme Court has
declared a national policy in favor of competition is of no moment as long as
the state restrains competition in a manner consistent with the state action
doctrine. This tension highlights one of the weaknesses of relying primarily on
advocacy to curtain state restraints – there is no threat of legal sanction if the
state refuses to heed the competition agency’s advice. Further, although
advocacy provides regulators with information concerning the likely economic
consequences of a policy choice, the Agencies are not constituents; neither the
FTC nor the DOJ can provide political support in the form of votes or
campaign contributions. Another important consideration is that the Agencies
themselves are regulatory bodies and may be subject to political pressure from
interest groups in much the same manner as federal or state agencies or
legislatures.128 For example, due to complaints from adversely affected
entity’s actions were to a small degree consistent with at least some of the FTC
recommendations, and that any action taken was largely or partly because of those
recommendations.” Id. Additionally, the author found that 47% of respondents gave the
comments “substantial weight because [they] came from the FTC.” Id. at 392. In 1989, a
virtually identical survey was sent by the Director of the FTC’s Advocacy Office to
recipients of comments dated June 1, 1987 through June 2, 1989. The responses to this
second survey were consistent with those from the first. (Results on file with authors).
126 Celnicker, supra note 125, at 400.
127 See DELEGATION OF UNITED STATES TO THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE, NOTE
SUBMITTED FOR OECD ROUNDTABLE ON EVALUATION OF THE ACTIONS AND RESOURCES OF
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES 7-8 (May 25, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
international/docs/evalauth.pdf.
128 See, e.g., Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins & Fred S. McChesney, Bureaucracy
and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 33 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1990); Timothy J. Muris,
Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of Congressional
Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 884, 888 (1986); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
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interest groups, in the late 1980s, Congress attempted to cripple, if not totally
eliminate the FTC’s advocacy program.129 Further, Congress and the
executive often apply more subtle pressure on the Agencies when competition
advocacy activities threaten favored industry.
III. THE TOOLKIT USED BY THE REST OF THE WORLD
Many foreign competition systems provide stronger means than one sees in
the United States to prevent or discourage government measures that suppress
competition.130 They accomplish this in essentially two ways. The first is to
establish explicit legal commands that forbid or severely limit the ability of
government institutions to curtail business rivalry. For example, the
competition provisions of the European Treaty and the jurisprudence of the
community courts strictly circumscribe the power of EU member states to
enact anticompetitive legislation or regulations.131 By these provisions and the
Treaty’s prohibition on state aids, EU competition policy regime places heavy
emphasis on achieving economic integration and forestalling member state
actions that would frustrate its attainment.132 The laws of some jurisdictions
make clear that state-owned enterprises are subject to the same competition
policy commands as private firms. Some competition systems enable the
competition authority to veto government acts that curtail competition unless
the restrictive measure has been approved by the national legislature.
A second approach is to give the competition agency a seat at the table in
the councils of government that make policy decisions about economic
intervention. In South Korea, for example, the Chair of the Korea Fair Trade
Commission (“KFTC”) has the status of a minister and thus may participate in
cabinet meetings as a regular member.133 This arrangement permits the KFTC
chairman to advocate, at the highest levels of government, the adoption of proBureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the
Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 792 (1983).
129 Celnicker, supra note 125, at 421.
130 See Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy Reform, supra note 2, at 400-04.
131 Regarding state aids, see Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Arts. 107109, and legislation enacted thereunder. See Competition, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/legislation.html (last visited July 6,
2010). For a description of the state aid rules, the procedures for their enforcement, and
judicial review, see Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay, THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 16:01 (2d
ed. 2007). Regarding other forms of anticompetitive actions by EU Member States, see
generally Richard Wainwright & André Bouquet, State Intervention and Action in EC
Competition Law, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY: FORDHAM CORPORATE
LAW INSTITUTE 539, 540 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2003).
132 Other than weak protections supplied by the Commerce Clause, the United States has
no equivalent to the EU’s ban upon state aids.
133 Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Art. 38 (2); see also OECD Review
of Regulatory Reform in Korea 187 (2000); Overview, KOREA FREE TRADE COMM’N,
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/about/overview.jsp (last visited June 10, 2010).
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competition policies. Such measures give the competition agency a stronger
platform to become directly involved in decisions made by other public
ministries and to participate more actively in decisions about responses to
economic crisis conditions.
IV. A PATH FORWARD FOR U.S. COMPETITION POLICY: TWO APPROACHES
THAT WOULD PROVIDE A STRONGER ROLE FOR THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY
VIS-À-VIS THE STATE
Broadly, there are two ways in which a competition authority can challenge
anticompetitive abuse of the regulatory process. It can engage policy makers
to achieve ex ante changes, or it can challenge anticompetitive regulation ex
post under the antitrust laws. The U.S. competition authorities are severely
circumscribed in both cases: FTC and DOJ can engage in advocacy, but have
no formal authority to veto policy; the state action and Noerr-Pennington
doctrines leave a vast array of anticompetitive conduct beyond the reach of
enforcement.
In what follows, we consider modifications of existing antitrust doctrine and
the institutional role of the competition authority that would provide a larger
scope for both ex ante and ex post interventions.
A.

Reconsideration of Legal Protection of State-Imposed Restrictions

As currently construed by the courts, the state action and Noerr-Pennington
doctrines sweep too far, protecting anticompetitive conduct that harms
consumers and advances neither the values of federalism nor freedom of
speech. There are two possible corrective paths. First, the Supreme Court
could reconsider some of its state action and Noerr-Pennington holdings.
Second, as it has done in the past to correct perceived Supreme Court missteps,
Congress could amend the antitrust laws to limit these antitrust doctrines.
However, the extent to which these doctrines represent more than merely
judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, and instead suggest constitutional
limits to the application of the antitrust laws, will present limits to the ability of
either the courts or Congress to expose a larger set of state action and
petitioning activity to antitrust scrutiny.
At the very least, going forward, the U.S. competition authorities should
strive to contain the growth of these immunities through targeted Amicus
briefs and advocacy opportunities. We also suggest, however, that the
competition agencies engage in an affirmative program using both its
enforcement and advocacy tools to move these doctrines in a more
competition-friendly direction, which we detail below.
1.

State Action

To narrow the reach of the state action doctrine requires expanding the
current zone of conflict between state economic regulation and federal antitrust
laws. The reach of the antitrust laws, and thus the size of this zone, in turn,
rests on how far Congress intended the antitrust laws to intrude into state
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affairs.134 Calls to reform the state action doctrine have a long pedigree and
range from minor tweaks in existing doctrine to wholesale overalls. Some
early critiques of the doctrine introduced public choice theory to argue that the
antitrust laws should preempt all anticompetitive or inefficient state
regulation,135 or at least inefficient regulation that appears to be the product of
capture.136 The underlying rationale behind these proposals is that, when
captured, the state becomes a mere vessel for private interests. When there is
evidence that the process is tainted with private interests, there is no reason to
suspect a regulatory scheme represents state action, and thus no reason for the
courts to hold the antitrust laws in abeyance. More recent critiques have taken
two paths to argue for a narrowing of state action immunity. Some attempt to
divine congressional intent to fashion optimal boundaries between federal
antitrust laws and state regulation. Others argue that the state action doctrine
should be bound by the extent to which it vindicates principles of federalism.
That is, there is no reason to assume that Congress did not intend the Sherman
Act to reach anticompetitive state conduct. So the only limiting principle on
this intent should be the extent to which Sherman Act intrusion impermissibly
interferes with state sovereignty.
In an influential paper, Professor Einer Elhauge argues that the underlying
rationale for the state action doctrine can be found in an interpretation of the
antitrust laws.137 He examines the legislative history of the Sherman Act and
suggests that antitrust is at its core about prohibiting only those restraints that
are the result of self-interested decision-makers.138 Thus, a decision to restrain
competition by a disinterested, politically accountable actor – such as a state
legislator or governor, or someone accountable to such an elected official – is
beyond the Sherman Act’s reach.139 Professor Elhauge’s analysis is primarily
descriptive, and he does not suggest an alteration in the current doctrine except
for urging the Court openly to acknowledge the underlying forces driving its
state action jurisprudence.
134

See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-86 (1996).
See, e.g., John Cirace, An Economic Analysis of the “State-Municipal Doctrine”
Antitrust Cases, 61 TEX. L. REV. 481, 514-15 (1982) (proposing rules for determining the
validity of competitive displacement and proposing reserving minimal state power to
regulate).
136 See, e.g., John Shepherd Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99
HARV. L. REV. 713, 743 (1986).
137 See Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV L. REV. 668,
668 (1991).
138 See id.
139 See id. Although Professor Elhauge states that his process inquiry is distinct from a
public/private distinction, we tend to agree with Professors McGowan and Lemley that it is
merely redefining – there is no meaningful difference between a public official and
Professor Elhauge’s “disinterested, politically accountable” decision-maker. See David
McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism,
Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 328 (1994).
135
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Also focusing on interpretation of the Sherman Act, Professor Richard
Squire contends that the problem with the antitrust preemption doctrine is that
it confuses issues of whether there has been an antitrust violation with
Supremacy Clause questions.140 He suggests retaining the current Midcal
framework for implied exemption questions – that is, those that involve a
defendant using the existence of an anticompetitive state law as a shield from
antitrust liability – but scrapping the existing preemption framework for one
that focuses more clearly on whether the state regulation in question conflicts
with the purpose behind the federal antitrust laws.141 Professor Squire
examines the core values of the antitrust laws and concludes that a preemption
test that focuses on consumer harm and producer enrichment, with important
limitations, would vindicate congressional intent.142 Conceding that laws that
transfer wealth from consumers to producers are ubiquitous,143 Professor
Squire suggests allowing laws that bundle consumer benefits with producer
benefits144 and those that pursue “fair” or “reasonable” prices.145
Professors Daniel Rubinfeld and Robert Inman do not focus on
congressional intent, but rather argue that the state action doctrine in its current

140

See Squire, supra note 80, at 77.
See id.
142 See id.
143 Id. at 106.
144 See id. at 111-13. Under this framework, Professor Squire argues that laws that create
entry barriers would be immune because they “do not raise prices in the manner ideally
suited for enriching a given set of producers.” Id. at 112. Although we do not disagree with
the ultimate conclusion – that entry barrier restrictions should not be preempted – we
disagree with his characterization of entry barriers. They do not, as Professor Squire argues,
raise prices because they force firms to move up increasing marginal cost curves. See id. at
113. Rather, entry barriers harm consumers by eliminating marketplace options and, when
low-cost competitors are excluded (as is the case in typical entry-barrier legislation),
depriving of them of competition between low-and high cost producers. For example, a
restriction on limited-service brokers does not harm consumers because it forces existing
full-service brokers to incur higher marginal costs by handling more transactions. Rather,
they deprive consumers of a novel marketplace option that may better suit their preferences,
and it deprives them of the lower prices and enhanced quality and service from full-service
brokers that is likely to accompany competition from limited service brokers. The same
analysis applies to barriers erected to keep online sellers at bay or to prevent non-attorneys
from performing routine legal tasks. Professor Squire’s scenario holds only in the special
case where incumbent and entrant firms produce similar goods or services and enjoy similar
costs structures.
145 Id. at 116. Under this test, Professor Squire would allow a state regulatory scheme to
stand if there is evidence that the regulator took consumer interests into account when
determining prices. He suggests that evidence that the state is involved in pricing decisions
is likely sufficient evidence of the pursuit of “fair” prices in most cases because it suggests
that the state voluntarily has incurred “public costs” that could be avoided if its purpose was
only to enrich producers without regard to consumers’ interests. Id. at 119.
141
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form is approximately optimal in securing the goals of federalism.146 Like
Professor Elhauge, they believe that the current doctrine tends to immunize
only that state action that is likely to be a product of a process that represents
the “public interest.”147 They would suggest only modifications for interstate
spillovers and municipalities.148 Professors Lemley and McGowan also argue
that the roots of state action immunity are federalism, not an interpretation of
the antitrust laws.149 Accordingly, they posit that only those state laws that can
be truly said to be the product of state, rather than private action, should be
immune.150 They suggest that the antitrust laws have given too much ground
to anticompetitive state regulation, and offer an augmented Midcal test that
would narrow the scope of state action immunity.151 Specifically, they suggest
that in addition to demanding that a policy be clearly articulated and actively
supervised, that the courts also should inquire into two additional factors to
determine the extent to which it can be said that the regulation in question is
the product of capture or true democratic governance: (1) whether the
regulation was urged by a private, economically interested actor or interest
group; and (2) whether the policy discriminates in favor of certain competitors
at the expense of others.152 Neither of these factors would be determinative,
but rather would be probative of the extent to which the regulatory program is
the result of capture rather than legitimate governance.153
Although these analyses of state action have much to commend them, we
note a few areas of caution. First, any viable approach to reconcile the
antitrust laws with anticompetitive state regulation must focus on the process
that led to the restraints rather than its economic effect. For this reason,
suggestions to improve the state action doctrine by evaluating the efficiency of
a regulation should be discarded; these reforms are probably undesirable from
a policy standpoint, and would be politically and jurisprudentially infeasible.
146

See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust StateAction Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory
Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1298 (1997).
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 McGowan & Lemley, supra note 139, at 293.
150 Id. at 357 (“[T]he fundamental principal of federalism at issue in the state action cases
is the distinction between states (or local governments) acting in their governance capacity
and those acting merely to barter private immunity from the antitrust laws. States are
entitled to deference when they are pursuing a legislative program toward some policy end,
but not when they are simply enacting without significant review the anticompetitive
policies proposed to them by private actors who stand to benefit.”).
151 See id. at 358.
152 Id.
153 See id. at 359-60. For example, evidence that a company was the primary proponent
of a regulation that benefits it at the expense of its competitors may be strongly suggestive
that the state was merely a vessel to vindicate private anticompetitive interests rather than
democratic preferences.
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At the most basic level, allowing federal courts to overrule state legislative
judgments on tradeoffs between competition and other social values is an
affront to democratic values; if citizens, through their elected representatives,
choose to forego the benefits of competition to pursue another value, they
should be allowed to do so. Apart from democratic concerns, it deprives the
nation of the benefits of federalism – letting states adopt solutions that more
closely fit the preferences of their populations,154 and allowing the nation as
whole to learn from this variation.155
A movement in this direction also would require the Court to overrule sixty
years of precedent that rests on an interpretation of a relatively unchanged
statute. Even if it could deliver a cogent rationale for such a stark departure
from stare decisis, the Court would be forced to perform world-class
jurisprudential gymnastics to distinguish antitrust preemption challenges to
state regulation from Lochner-esque challenges to the same thing. Although
they could facially be challenged as concerning different constitutional clauses
– substantive rights are included in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause versus the Supremacy Clause – it may be distinction without a
difference as it would end in the same way: federal courts second-guessing the
efficiency of state economic regulation.156 An easier way to achieve this result
would probably be for Congress to amend the antitrust laws to note explicitly
that it intended to supplant anticompetitive state regulation. Of course, this
approach would be politically infeasible as both sides of the aisle have roundly
excoriated the Lochner era: from the right, a return to Lochner is an affront to
states’ rights and the ability to craft local solutions to local problems; from the
left, Lochner represents blind obedience to the free market without regard to
market failures.157
When an anticompetitive restraint rightly can be considered the product of
the state rather than private interests, federalism concerns counsel against
application of the antitrust laws. Probing the process that gives rise to a
regulatory scheme can shed light on this question. Inquiries that go beyond the
154

See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 1217-18 (1997).
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould through experimentation, our
economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs.”).
156 Cmty. Commc’n Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(forcing a municipality to defend the reasonableness of an anticompetitive regulation “on
the basis that its benefits to the community outweigh its anticompetitive effects” will cause
courts “to review social legislation in a manner reminiscent of the Lochner era” (citation
omitted)). But see Wiley, supra note 136, at 779. Wiley argues that these inquires would be
distinct because an inquiry into efficiency under an antitrust preemption case does not
impose a constitutional mandate for free markets, as a Due Process challenge does, but
rather merely represents a congressional preference for free markets, which can be revoked.
Thus, the courts are merely vindicating congressional intent rather than forcing their own
preferences for free markets onto states.
157 See Squire, supra note 80, at 104.
155
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process and examine the political forces that shaped the regulation, however,
have the potential to slide into a review of substance rather than process. For
example, evaluating a regulatory scheme on its face to distinguish state
programs that serve the “public interest” from those that are merely designed
to enrich favored producers will force the development of normative criteria by
which to judge the “public interest.”158 Even milder forms of this inquiry that
ask only whether lobbying occurred in effect create a presumption that the
ultimate regulatory outcome in the presence of lobbying is almost surely
tainted with private interest rather than a representation of a politically
accountable decision-maker’s view of the public interest. Such a presumption,
again, would require courts to judge the regulatory scheme pushed by private
interests, and ultimately adopted, against some normative criteria.159
Inquiry into regulatory causation also poses administrative and
constitutional concerns. First, as others have pointed out, trying to tease out
the true motivations behind a regulatory scheme is difficult – most lobbying
efforts to obtain regulation that impairs competition at the expense of another
group are opposed.160 When the anticompetitive outcome is achieved, it would
be a purely subjective judgment to say that a state legislature adopted the
anticompetitive policy because its members were “captured,” rather than
because they believed the adopted policy was in the public interest. The Court
stressed this point in Omni, where it closed the door on any conspiracy
exception that does not involve the state as a market participant, and eschewed
inquiries that would examine extrinsic evidence, including evidence of bribery,
to discern whether state actors who adopt anticompetitive legislation are truly
concerned with the public interest.161 As in other areas of antitrust law,
liability rules based on speculative assessments of subjective intent should be
avoided, especially when error costs are likely to be high. And, they are likely
to be high in these cases – the possibility of ex post liability may chill
willingness to lobby for, or to enact, regulation or legislation.
This brings us to our constitutional point. The Court has been clear since
Noerr that First Amendment concerns counsel an interpretation of the antitrust
laws that do not reach lobbying for even anticompetitive regulation. The same
caution in Noerr applies with equal force here. Explorations into the extent to
which industry lobbyists shape governmental officials’ motives are likely to

158 See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 139, at 360 (advocating the examination of
regulation to determine if it discriminates among producers within the same industry);
Squire, supra note 80, at 112 (advocating examination of text of regulations to see if they
have mixed beneficiaries rather than merely enriching producers); Wiley, supra note 136, at
770-71 (advocating examination of text to determine if it clearly benefits one group of
producers and advances no plausible legitimate public interest).
159 See Elhauge, supra note 137, at 723.
160 See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 375, 377 (1991).
161 See id. at 375, 378-79.
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deter petitioning that is protected by the First Amendment.162 Any rule that
chills this protected behavior runs the risk of impinging on the First
Amendment. This point seems in some ways a corollary to the Court’s
statement in Omni that it would be “peculiar in a democracy, and perhaps in
derogation of the constitutional right to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances, to establish a category of lawful state action that citizens are not
permitted to urge.”163 If this statement is true, it appears equally true that
courts cannot narrow the states’ ability to regulate based on the degree to
which such regulation derives from First Amendment protected speech.
With the above admonitions in mind, we offer a hybrid approach that
focuses both on vindicating congressional intent behind the antitrust laws and
federalism principles, but would retain much of the Court’s current framework.
Specifically, below we argue that fealty to congressional intent should lead to
preemption of a broader class of laws than only those that promote or permit
unsupervised per se illegal conduct. We also contend that to the extent that
federalism animates the preemption question, courts should be more willing to
find clear conflict with the antitrust laws when state-imposed restrictions on
competition are the product of regulatory boards comprised of private actors or
result in costs that are predominantly exported to neighboring states.
Broadening the concept of “inherent conflict.” As described above, current
preemption doctrine finds an inherent conflict only when a law mandates or
authorizes unsupervised per se illegal conduct. Although some have criticized
this approach,164 we believe that it is consistent with the broader strain of
conflict preemption doctrine that strikes down state laws only when they
directly frustrate the purpose of a federal regulatory regime. Determining
whether conflict exists in the first place is a fairly easy exercise when the
federal and state regimes set out specific standards, for example, parts-permillion of a pollutant. What differentiates antitrust preemption from
preemption in other areas is that Congress set out notoriously vague antitrust

162 Wiley recognizes this potential but argues that allowing petitioning for efficient
regulations and exemptions from the antitrust laws would sufficiently vindicate firms’ First
Amendment rights. See Wiley, supra note 136, at 779-80.
163 Omni, 499 U.S. at 379 (citation omitted). Omni further stated:
Insofar as the identification of an immunity-destroying “conspiracy” is concerned,
Parker and Noerr generally present two faces of the same coin. . . . The same factors
which . . . make it impracticable or beyond the purpose of the antitrust laws to identity
and invalidate lawmaking that has been infected by selfishly motivated agreement with
private interests likewise make it impracticable or beyond that scope to identity and
invalidate lobbying that has produced selfishly motivated agreement with public
officials.
Id. at 383.
164 See Squire, supra note 80, at 93-96.
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standards that the courts have filled in through common law.165 Unlike the
case of an environmental law that requires the Environmental Protection
Agency to set a ceiling for pollutant levels, we can know which state laws
conflict with the antitrust laws only by knowing what conduct violates the
antitrust laws, and we can only know this by looking at what federal courts
have said violate the antitrust laws. In this manner, the federal courts have
acted as bureaucrats, promulgating regulations that flesh out more precise
standards of conduct.166 Setting aside more than one hundred years of
precedent that let us know, broadly, what conduct is likely to violate the
antitrust laws to develop a parallel set of core principles that should guide
preemption inquiries is likely to be confusing, inefficient, and facilitate judicial
oversight of state regulatory decisions.167
A more modest, and hence more feasible, solution than scrapping the Midcal
approach to preemption, would be for the Court to expand the class of private
unsupervised conduct that necessarily conflicts with the antitrust laws, and thus
is subject to preemption. In its current formulation, the Court has said that
clear conflict exists when a law causes a private party to violate the antitrust
laws in all cases.168 The only type of conduct that satisfies this standard is that
which constitutes a per se violation – unlike unilateral acts or conduct that is
reviewed under the rule of reason, courts will not entertain any efficiency
defenses to this class of behavior;169 thus a statute authorizing per se illegal
behavior, creates a conflict with the antitrust laws with one hundred percent
likelihood. There are, however, regulatory schemes that do not authorize
parties to engage in per se violations, but rather authorize or compel them to
engage in conduct that is highly likely to facilitate conduct that violates the
antitrust laws. Several states, for example, require wholesalers of alcoholic
beverages to post their future prices with the state agency in a manner that
allows them to share price information with their competitors, and to hold
these prices for a certain period of time, often thirty to sixty days.170 These
165

See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1183 (1989) (“One can hardly imagine a prescription more vague than the Sherman
Act’s prohibition of contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.”).
166 See Wiley, supra note 136, at 777.
See generally Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust
Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that antifederalist tendencies led
Congress to allow the substantive standards in antitrust to develop through common law
rather than from a federal regulation).
167 For example, under Squire’s proposal, Midcal would not be preempted because the
resale price maintenance scheme at issue in that case was likely efficient, and thus did not
serve solely to enrich producers. See Squire, supra note 80, at 123-24. This scenario would
involve evaluating the efficiency of the state program. See id.
168 See supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
169 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust: Confusing Offenses with
Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165, 178 (1988).
170 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 30-63 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-1029 (2010);
GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 560-2-3.45 (2010); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 45:30-3-7 (2010).
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post-and-hold rules neither mandate nor authorize wholesalers to engage in
price fixing, but the regulatory regime makes such collusive agreements highly
likely.171 Courts do not condemn private agreements to share future prices per
se.172 Nonetheless, they should be treated with a high degree of suspicion
given their ability to facilitate tacit or explicit collusion.
Consonant with the underlying antitrust analysis of inherently suspect
arrangements, preemption analysis of regulatory regimes that appear very
likely to facilitate per se illegal behavior should start with a rebuttable
presumption that these laws are in clear conflict with the antitrust law.173 A
plaintiff will meet its burden of persuasion with, for example, market structure
evidence suggesting that the market in question is conducive to collusion or
empirical evidence that similar regulations have led to collusion in other
markets. This presumption would be sharply strengthened if a plaintiff can
show that those subject to a regulatory regime actually have engaged in per se
illegal behavior, either through direct documentary and testimonial evidence or
econometric evidence that pricing patterns are more likely the product of
collusion than competition. The burden of persuasion would then shift to the
defendant to prove that the regulatory regime is not likely to facilitate per se
illegal behavior with, for example, evidence that contradicts plaintiff’s
characterization of the market’s predisposition to per se illegal behavior. In the
case that there is evidence of actual per se conduct, to avoid preemption, the
state would have to show that the regulatory regime was not a facilitator.174

171

In one case, for example, a wholesaler testified that he and rival wholesalers used the
public posting to reach an agreement on a new price for beer. See Miller v. Hedlund, 717 F.
Supp. 711, 714 (D. Or. 1989) (“Maletis testified that in 1986 . . . his wholesale business and
one of the largest beer and wine wholesalers in the State of Oregon, used the price posting
exchange at the OLCC as a starting point for communicating with competing wholesalers of
keg beer until agreement was reach by all wholesalers of keg beer on a new wholesale price
for keg beer.”); see also James C. Cooper & Joshua D. Wright, State Regulation of Alcohol
Distribution: The Effects of Post-and-Hold Laws on Output and Social Harms (George
Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-32, 2010) (finding that post-and-hold
laws raise reduce consumption of alcoholic beverages but do not have any effect on drunk
driving or underage drinking), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1641415.
172 See United States v. Citizens S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975).
173 See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2113 (3d ed.
2006) (“[W]e would consider directly interseller communications of current prices on
specific transactions to be ‘nearly naked’ restraints subject only to a quick look for possible
cost reducing or output increasing circumstances.”).
174 This approach is the analog to the rule used by courts presented with evidence of
information exchange and parallel pricing, which requires the plaintiff to establish a link
between the information exchange and the parallel pricing that excludes the possibility of
unilateral conduct. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028,
1034 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring plaintiffs to show that information exchanges had an effect
on pricing). In our proposed framework, the burden is on the defendant to provide evidence
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Shifting the focus in this manner could have the collateral benefit of helping
to clear up the currently messy concept of “hybrid restraints” as it is applied to
horizontal restraints. As noted above, the Supreme Court developed the notion
of hybrid restraints to create the fiction of agreement in preemption cases
involving government regulation that required downstream sellers to adhere to
prices set by upstream suppliers.175 Lower courts have had difficulty applying
this concept, however, to regimes that create conditions that are likely to
facilitate collusive agreements, but which neither authorize nor mandate
collusion.176 For example, some courts addressing post-and-holds have held
that the state-mandated price holding acts as an agreement to hold prices
constant, which is a per se violation under Supreme Court precedent.177
Although from a policy standpoint, striking down these post-and-hold laws is
desirable, the legal reasoning to reach the result is suspect. It is hard to
distinguish the rent ceiling ordinance in Fisher from the required holding
requirement. If the Court in Fisher was clear that the fact that all landlords had
to abide by the rent ceiling did not transform the ordinance into a
conspiracy,178 it is unclear how an ordinance that compels wholesalers to hold
their prices can be transformed into a price fixing arrangement. Neither regime
mandates or allows per se illegal behavior, but rather requires each producer
unilaterally to following a state-invented pricing rule. That is, unlike the resale
price maintenance schemes at issue in Midcal and Schwegmann,179 the
government, as opposed to private parties, have restrained pricing freedom.180
By keeping the focus on the natural or likely unsupervised private behavior –
per se illegal price fixing or market allocation – that flows from the statecompelled conduct, our proposed test would avoid the current doctrinal mess
and lead to results consistent with Fisher.

that tends to exclude the possibility that the observed pricing was not the product of the
regulatory regime.
175 See Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 340 (1987) (authorizing a regulatory
scheme that allowed wholesalers to dictate retail margins); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99-100 (1980) (authorizing a scheme whereby
wholesalers were required to adhere to manufacturer-set price schedule).
176 See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 887 (9th Cir. 2008); Freedom
Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 224 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004); TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242
F.3d 198, 210 (4th Cir. 2001); Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 173 (2d
Cir. 1984); Flying J., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 597 F. Supp. 2d. 848, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2009); Lotus
Bus. Grp. LLC v. Flying J., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1023 (E.D. Wis. 2007).
177 Costco Wholesale, 522 F.3d at 895 (citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446
U.S. 643, 649-50 (1980)); TFWS, 242 F.3d at 209-10 (citing Catalano, 446 U.S. at 649-50).
178 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 267 (1986) (“[T]he mere fact that all
competing property owners must comply with the same provision of the Ordinance is not
enough to establish a conspiracy among landlords.”).
179
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
180 See Fisher, 475 U.S. at 269.
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In theory, Congress could accomplish such a modification of the state
action, but it would be hard to envision a legislative fix that would neither be
over- nor under-inclusive in defining ex ante the set of circumstances that
merit a rebuttable presumption of preemption. Courts fashion rules that govern
antitrust analysis based on cumulative experience and economic learning.181
Indeed, these factors have led courts to move certain practices from the per se
column to the rule of reason column,182 and to develop strong presumptions of
illegality for other restraints.183 Thus, given the needed flexibility in defining
the exact nature of the government restraint, this modification should be
accomplished judicially.
Treatment of regulatory boards comprised of private actors. Another tweak
at the margins of the state action doctrine would be to make it clear that
subdivisions within the state comprised of market participants are considered
private parties. As discussed in Part I.B, this uncertainty has important
negative consequences for competition policy. Much anticompetitive conduct
is not the result of legislation, but rather emanates from regulatory boards
made up of decision makers who wear their regulatory hat at the board’s
monthly meetings, but earn a living in the very profession that they have been
charged to regulate the other 353 days of the year.184 Given their financial self
interest, there seems to be no principled reason to consider these actors
181

See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 (2007)
(“[T]he per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with
the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be
invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason. It should come as no
surprise, then, that ‘we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to
restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious.’”(citations omitted)); Cal. Dental Ass’n v.
FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) (stating that the ability of a court to draw “a confident
conclusion about the principal tendency of a restraint . . . may vary over time, if rule-ofreason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions”); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[W]e have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to
restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of
certain practices is not immediately obvious.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); FTC v.
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (exhibiting hesitancy to condemn and
subject particular conduct to unreasonable per se analysis, and, in general, to extend per se
analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“[I]t is only after considerable experience with certain
business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations.” (internal quotation
marks omitted); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[A]s
economic learning and market experience evolve, so too will the class of restraints subject
to summary adjudication.”).
182 See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886-87; Khan, 522 U.S. at 20.
183 See Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459; Polygram Holding, 416 F.3d at 36.
184 For example, most real estate commissions, state bar ethics committees, and boards of
dentistry are comprised of practitioners. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 99.
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anything but private.185 Treating these actors as private parties would have two
implications: first a state law that delegated to a board or commission
comprised of private actors the ability to engage in unsupervised per se illegal
conduct – for example, setting prices or banning advertising – would be
preempted; second, the state entity itself would be subject to an antitrust suit if
it were not supervised by a sovereign state component.
Of course, critics of this approach may argue that it allows an unacceptable
level of federal oversight of state regulations. When state boards are rightly
characterized as private actors, however, there is no reason for courts not to
explore the anticompetitive effects of their concerted action in that same way
they would for private corporations that unsuccessfully tried to take refuge in
the state action doctrine. At the same time, several important firewalls would
be built into such a framework to prevent unwarranted judicial intervention
into state affairs. First, antitrust claims can be directed only at state regulation
that impairs competition. For example, some state safety regulations may be
unwise from a policy standpoint – imposing costs greater than benefits – but,
because it applies equally to all firms, would not be subject to antitrust
challenge because there is no underlying antitrust violation. On the other hand,
a regulation that fixes commission rates or erects entry barriers for low-cost
competitors clearly implicates competition.
This proposal also presents the same concern that Chief Justice Rehnquist
raised in his City of Boulder dissent: if the regulatory board is to be treated as a
private entity (or a collection of private interests) for antitrust purposes, should
it be allowed to justify anticompetitive actions with other societal goals?186
Clearly, under National Society of Professional Engineers, courts will not
accept the defense from private parties that competition itself is undesirable.
Of course, to limit a state board to defend its actions without reference to noncompetition values would be to ignore their nature; as creatures of the state,
they are charged with making policy based on considerations beyond
competition and it would be unfair to penalize them for taking these values into
account.187 But, if we grant state agencies an exception from National Society
of Professional Engineers’s strictures on defenses, however, do we risk a
return to Lochner-ian federal oversight of state affairs? Although these
concerns are not without merit in the context of municipal regulation by

185

See 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 173, at ¶ 228 (recommending classifying as
private any organization in which the decisive coalition is made up of market participants).
186 See Cmty. Commc’n Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 67 (1982) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
187 The analysis that follows implicitly applies to per se offenses too. Although private
parties are barred from offering defenses to per se offenses because the court has deemed
them to be anticompetitive in almost all cases, the same bar would not apply to state boards
that enact per se illegal regulations because they will be able to offer non-competition
benefits to justify the almost certain anticompetitive effects their policy.
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elected city officials, they are insufficient to insulate state boards comprised of
market participants from antitrust scrutiny.
First, fealty to federalism may counsel giving state sovereigns (legislatures,
supreme courts acting in legislative capacity, and likely the executive) wide
berth when developing policy that has negative impacts on competition.
Private parties who occasionally are cloaked in a modicum of state authority,
however, are not sovereign, so deference to their anticompetitive policies does
not vindicate the federalism principles that animate the state action doctrine.188
Second, boards composed of private market participants pose greater
competitive dangers than elected representatives, and hence deserve more
invasive antitrust oversight. Because of the risk that private parties will pursue
their own interests, states cannot merely authorize them to violate the antitrust
laws to pursue state policies – they must supervise their conduct to assure
consonance with state policy. There simply is no principled difference
between wholly private actors and those clothed in state authority, via their
title (e.g., “real estate commissioner,” or member of the “board of dentistry” or
“board of optometry”), for a few days each year. If public choice theory has
taught us anything, it is that those who work in government do not check their
private incentives at the entrance to their building. This lesson is all the more
relevant in situations involving those who are charged with governing in
tandem with their private enterprise. As then-Judge Breyer noted in FTC v.
Monahan,189 the Massachusetts Pharmacy Board may be engaged in activities
that “are ‘essentially’ those of private parties,” and that the relevant state action
inquiry was “how the Board functions in practice, and perhaps upon the role
played by its members who are private pharmacists.”190 In this manner,
antitrust review of the reasonableness of anticompetitive policies enacted
would merely take the place of state review that is lacking. Third, as Professor
Wiley has pointed out, Lochner-era decisions left no escape valve because they
were grounded in the Constitution.191 If Congress were displeased with courts’
review of reasonableness for state boards comprised of private actions,
however, it could always revoke this power by amending the antitrust laws.
Another check on judicial meddling is found in Midcal: private parties can
engage in conduct that otherwise would violate the antitrust laws if they are
acting pursuant to a clear government policy and are actively supervised by the
188

The Court has been clear about this distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign
actions in its jurisprudence. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984) (stating
that action taken by “a nonsovereign state representative” requires “a showing that the
conduct is pursuant to a ‘clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy’ to
replace competition with regulation”); Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)
(“The threshold inquiry into determining if an anticompetitive activity is state action of the
type the Sherman Act was not meant to proscribe is whether the activity is required by the
State acting as sovereign.”).
189 832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987).
190 Id. at 690.
191 See Wiley, supra note 136, at 779.
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state. Thus, anticompetitive regulations promulgated by self-interested boards
still can be saved if it can be shown that they are acting for the state rather than
on their own account. Requiring a state board’s anticompetitive regulations to
be actively supervised may reduce a state’s flexibility in implementing its
policies,192 but this is the price the state must pay when it desires to thwart the
national policy in favor of competition. There need to be assurances that the
state, rather than a collection of private self-interested actors working under the
color of state authority, has made the choice to restrain competition.
Congress could amend the definition of private party for the antitrust laws,
but given the reaction in the wake of Hallie, this would be politically
unlikely.193 The better course would probably be for the Court to effect this
change since it has never ruled on the issue.194 To assuage concerns that
subjecting state regulators to the potential of treble damages may deter
efficient administration of state law, another possible congressional fix would
be to allow only the FTC, under the FTC Act, to bring actions against state
boards. This approach would ensure that at most, states would be subject only
to equitable remedies (e.g., enjoining anticompetitive regulation and perhaps
fencing-in relief) and, moreover, there that there could be no follow-on private
litigation that may pose the threat of treble monetary damages.195 It is also
similar to the congressional reaction to Hallie, which was to allow only
injunctive relief in antitrust suits against municipalities.196
Interstate spillovers. The federalism-based justification for the Court’s
current state action construction rests on a theory of political accountability.
When the sovereign restricts competition as part of a broader regulatory
scheme – either directly or indirectly through supervised private parties – it is
acting (at least in theory) on behalf of a population that has chosen through the
democratic process to forego the benefits of competition to achieve another
goal. When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory
scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however,
there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism
concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.
Leaving aside disenfranchisement concerns, it is well-known that the ability to
externalize costs leads to overconsumption; when citizens can export the costs

192

See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 646-47 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
193 See Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (2006).
194 In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, the Court stated in dicta that “[i]n cases in
which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active supervision would also not be
required, although we do not here decide that issue.” 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985).
195 Although equitable remedies may not provide adequate deterrence, at least
injunctions provide a vehicle for stopping ongoing anticompetitive conduct, which will
inure to consumers. Further, the cost of defending a federal antitrust suit is likely to provide
additional deterrence.
196 See 15 U.S.C. § 35.
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of a program – higher prices – and capture the full benefits – rents to a favored
group, it will set inefficiently high levels of regulation.197
It is hard to envision a transaction that does not in some way export costs to
neighboring states – allowed to run rampant, an interstate spillover exception
ultimately could swallow the whole state action doctrine. Accordingly, this
exception should be limited to instances where the spillovers are large – both
in terms of the magnitude of the overcharge and the proportion of the
overcharge that is exported to other states. First, with respect to the latter
condition, courts should focus on instances where more than half of the
industry output is sent into interstate commerce. Second, it is also important to
realize that even if a state exports most of the output from the industry subject
to the anticompetitive regulatory scheme, when the regulated industry faces
substantial interstate competition, it will be unable to force extraterritorial
customers to pay the overcharge.198 Professors Rubinfeld and Inman, for
example, suggest following the U.S. Department of Justice’s and the Federal
Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines to limit an interstate
spillover exception to those instances in which an industry could profitably
raise prices to non-residents by at least five percent.199 A more tractable
approach that would economize on judicial resources and limit battles of
economic experts may be to use a threshold national or regional market share
of roughly seventy percent as a screen before delving into more complex
analysis.200
An additional cabin to a spillover exception would again be that the
underlying conduct mandated or promoted by the law would otherwise violate
the antitrust laws. Although health and safety regulations or taxes that more or
less affect all market participants equally but that export costs could be
challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, they could not be challenged
under a Supremacy Clause theory that they conflict with the antitrust laws.
These limitations also would help to assure that a spillover exception to state
action immunity does not eviscerate Dormant Commerce Clause

197 See Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23, 38-39 (1983); Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 1238-39.
198 Of course, this observation suggests that industries that export most of their product
into competitive national markets would have little incentive to seek this kind of regulation.
199 See Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 146, at 1277-80.
200 Courts generally support a finding of monopoly power with shares at or above the
seventy percent range. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504
U.S. 451, 484 (1992); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
A seventy percent threshold screen strikes a good balance between costs associated with
wasted judicial resources and erroneously allowing a suit to preempt an anticompetitive
state law to go forward when interstate effects are negligible, on the one hand, and the
possibility of erroneously allowing a law with appreciable interstate effects to stand, on the
other.

1600

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1555

jurisprudence.201 In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,202 the Supreme Court held a
non-discriminatory local regulation that indirectly affects interstate commerce
is constitutional as long as it is directed at a legitimate local interest, and it
does not place an unduly large burden on interstate commerce in relation to its
purported local benefits.203 Steering away from laws that are not otherwise
subject to preemption would limit the extent to which a spillover exception to
the state action doctrine could become a back-door way to challenge local
regulation that otherwise would be constitutionally firm under a Pike balancing
test.
At the same time, we believe that Supremacy Clause analysis should take
precedent over Dormant Commerce Clause analysis when spillover effects are
sufficiently large.204 There is a danger of conflict between a spillover
exception to the state action doctrine and Pike when a state law allows
supervised per se illegal behavior in an industry that exports a large majority of
its output. The Court has been clear that promoting supracompetitive prices is
a legitimate state interest in Pike balancing.205 The Court also explicitly
blessed Parker, a case in which a cartel exported ninety-five percent of its
product to other states or countries.206 Thus, there may be cases in which
Dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause challenges would reach
different conclusions because, for example, exported overcharges were small
in relation to the purported local benefits.
These inconsistent outcomes should not be troubling, because Dormant
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause actions have different rationales.
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis concerns states’ powers to affect
interstate commerce in an area where Congress has not exercised its commerce

201 That is, there needs to be a set of conduct that impermissibly burdens interstate
commerce, but otherwise is not subject to preemption, on the one hand, and a set of conduct
that is subject to preemption, but does not burden interstate commerce, on the other.
202 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
203 See id. at 142 (“Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (“[When a local law] has only indirect effects on interstate
commerce and regulates even-handedly, we have examined whether the State’s interest is
legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local
benefits.”).
204 See Easterbrook, supra note 197, at 45-46 (arguing that federal antitrust laws should
apply to state regulation only in the case of substantial interstate spillovers). But see
Elhauge, supra note 137, at 732 (commenting that the courts may have trouble determining
whether a law disproportionately burdens outsiders and contending that in-state consumers
who have a political voice are good proxies for those affected out of state).
205 Pike, 397 U.S. at 143 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
206 Parker, 317 U.S. at 345.
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power.207 Antitrust preemption, on the other hand, concerns a state’s power to
act inconsistently with a policy that Congress expressed to the fullest extent of
its commerce power.208 That is, when Congress has spoken, Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis is irrelevant; the task becomes one of
accommodating inconsistent state and federal policies. When the costs of
anticompetitive state action fall on those who have no say in the decision, the
core rationale underlying the state action doctrine – federalism – is not present,
and hence there is no reason to interpret antitrust laws so as not to cover the
suspect regulation.
Although it would need to finesse Parker, the Court probably could effect
this approach without serious stare decisis concerns. In Parker, the Court
rejected commerce clause arguments in large part because the economic
support of farmers was a matter of state and national concern during the
Depression.209 Indeed, the Parker Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis relied heavily on the panoply of federal policies that existed to support
agricultural prices.210 Parker, therefore, must be seen in its historical context –
the antitrust laws existed side-by-side with a federal policy to stabilize
agricultural prices in an attempt to stem the severe economic downturn. As the
Court explained, the proration scheme was a local regulation “whose effect
upon national commerce is such as not to conflict but to coincide with a policy
which Congress has established with respect to it.”211 Viewed through this
lens, Parker did not really present a state-federal conflict;212 rather, the conflict
was between the federal policy in favor of competition and the federal and
state polices that saw robust competition as the root of depressed agricultural
prices. Because competition concerns often lost out to New Deal programs at
the federal level, it is safe to assume that California’s scheme in Parker would
be inoculated against antitrust challenge under our proposed spillover test.
Although citizens in raisin-importing states did not acquiesce in California’s
raisin proration regulation, they had indirectly agreed to suspend competition
207

See id. at 362 (explaining that a Dormant Commerce Clause inquiry reconciles state
regulation of local matters that affect interstate commerce “[w]hen Congress has not exerted
its power under the Commerce Clause”).
208 See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (“Congress,
in passing the Sherman Act, . . . ‘exercised all the power it possessed.’” (quoting Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940))).
209 See Parker, 317 U.S. at 367.
210 What’s more, the California program at issue in Parker had at least some connection
to a federal price support program. See id. at 366 (discussing that Raisin Proration Zone No.
1 received loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation that were conditioned on the
creation of a proration zone and that its surplus crops were sold to the Federal Surplus
Commodities Corporation).
211 Id. at 363.
212 See id. (“There may also be, as in the present case, local regulations whose effect
upon the national commerce is such as not to conflict but to coincide with a policy which
Congress has established with respect to it.”).
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norms in agricultural markets through their political participation at the federal
level. Had the price support program in Parker taken place beyond the
umbrella of a consonant federal policy to support agricultural prices, it is not at
all clear that the outcome would have remained the same.
2.

Noerr-Pennington

Like the state action doctrine, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine has evolved as
the Court attempted to avoid a conflict between the antitrust laws and the
Constitution. Noerr has developed as a doctrine of statutory interpretation in
the face of First Amendment concerns. This evolutionary path has created an
interstice between the reach of the antitrust laws and the First Amendment,
which means that the Court (or Congress) has room to make Pareto
improvements to the doctrine; that is, there is room to clarify Noerr in a way
that permits antitrust scrutiny of previously immune anticompetitive conduct
without diminishing incentives to engage in First Amendment protected speech
or reducing the scope and effectiveness of governmental decision making.
Below we identify two areas that are especially ripe for such clarification.
Broadening the scope of the sham exception for a pattern of filings. Noerr
does not protect attempts to use the governmental process, as opposed to the
outcome of that process, to hinder competition. Thus, a company that sues a
competitor in the hopes of enjoining it from using copyrighted software enjoys
immunity. On the other hand, a firm that initiates a zoning proceeding without
any interest in the ultimate outcome and solely to delay a competitor’s market
entry and to force it to it to pay a higher interest rate for bonds213 does not
enjoy Noerr protection. This dichotomy makes sense because the former
scenario implicates a legitimate attempt to secure governmental action, which
is constitutionally protected, whereas the latter scenario does not involve the
exercise of a First Amendment right.
In reality, however, distinguishing legitimate attempts to secure government
action from “sham” petitioning, which is designed to use process as an
anticompetitive weapon, can be a difficult task because it ultimately involves
an inquiry into the intent behind a decision to initiate a government
proceeding. PREI, the Court’s most recent pronouncement on the topic, held
that the inquiry – to determine whether a suit was a legitimate attempt to
procure government action or merely an attempt to impose process-based costs
on a rival – is two-fold: the threshold question is whether a filing is objectively
baseless; only if this condition is met may the fact finder inquire into
subjective motivation for bringing the suit.214 The PREI standard for objective

213

See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973).
See Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PREI), 508
U.S. 49, 50, 57 (1993) (“[A]n objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be a sham
regardless of subjective intent.”).
214
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baselessness, moreover, is a stringent one – it is only met upon a showing that
no reasonable litigant could possibly expect success on the merits.215
The Court thus requires an antitrust plaintiff to satisfy an objective screen
before it will entertain a full-fledged inquiry into the subjective intent behind
petitioning. This is consistent with antitrust jurisprudence that shows concern
for over-deterring procompetitive conduct when information is imperfect.216
Although one may infer intent from the available evidence, it can never be
directly ascertained. Intent resides only in the defendant’s mind, and, in the
face of an antitrust suit, the defendant will always claim that its intent behind
filing was to obtain relief, not to impose direct costs. Thus, any inquiry into
intent is necessarily subjective and thus prone to error because it is not subject
to external verification. An objective measurement, on the other hand, is based
on observable phenomena that look the same to all observers and that are
therefore untainted by personal opinion.217
For a single filing, the objectively baseless threshold is understandably high.
Courts have very little information, and the stakes are significant. The threat
of treble damages that hinge on an overarching inquiry into subjective intent
will likely chill legitimate petitioning activity.218 Thus, PREI probably strikes
the right balance between competition values and the First Amendment in the
context of a single – or very few – filings. When courts are faced with a host
of filings directed at the same competitor, however, a less stringent inquiry into
objective baselessness than the one the Court used in PREI makes sense.
Ceteris paribus, larger data sets mean more precise parameter estimates.219 In
the context of petitioning, courts use the available evidence to estimate an
answer to the threshold question – was the defendant using the process to harm
a competitor rather than to obtain governmental action? With more
information, and hence more accurate estimates of underlying purpose, courts
can be both more confident in the inferences they take from the evidence and
less worried about falsely condemning true petitioning. For example, a data
set of fifty identical zoning challenges filed to delay a rival’s entry provides a
far more accurate estimate of underlying intent than one lawsuit filed to enjoin
a competitor from using allegedly copyrighted material.

215

See id. at 62-63.
See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1120 (2009);
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226
(1993).
217 The difference between objective and subjective inquiries is the difference between
scoring figure skating and football: determining the winner in the former contest is often a
matter of contention because it requires subjective assessments; determining the winner in
the latter merely requires looking at the scoreboard.
218 See PREI, 508 U.S. at 69-70 (Stevens, J., concurring).
219 An estimated parameter’s standard error defines the level of confidence one has in its
accuracy. Standard errors decrease as sample sizes increase.
216
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Thus, in the repetitive petitioning scenario, we suggest that courts should
still adhere to an objective threshold before engaging in a full-fledged intent
inquiry, but that they adopt a less-stringent objective baselessness test than the
one in PREI. We think that given the accuracy that goes along with enhanced
data, the risk of deterring protected speech is minimal – thus, this rule would
address “breathing space” concerns. Further, because this test addresses harm
coming from abuse of the process rather than the outcome, it in no way
infringes upon states’ rights to engage in economic regulation.
A defendant’s win rate is one possible candidate for a less stringent
objective screen. The only two federal courts of appeal to have addressed
squarely how pattern cases like California Motor Transport should be
analyzed after PREI have adopted this standard. In USS-POSCO Industries v.
Contra Costa County Building & Construction Trades Council,220 the Ninth
Circuit stated that PREI’s evaluation of a single suit is “essentially
retrospective: If the suit turns out to have objective merit, the plaintiff can’t
proceed to inquire into subjective purposes, and the action is perforce not a
sham.”221 Because the Supreme Court recognized in California Motor
Transport that a series of suits can inflict much more harm on a competitor
than a single suit, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
When dealing with a series of lawsuits, the question is not whether any
one of them has merit – some may turn out to, just as a matter of chance –
but whether they are brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal
proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a
market rival.222
The court used the success rate to infer whether the litigation was filed without
regard to the merit, but because the defendants had succeeded in over half of
its suits, the court concluded that plaintiffs could not overcome defendants’
Noerr defense.223 The Second Circuit subsequently adopted similar reasoning

220

31 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J.).
Id. at 811.
222 Id.
223 See id. (that more than half of the actions turned out to have merit “cannot be
reconciled with the charge that the unions were filing lawsuits and other actions willy-nilly
without regard to success”); see also Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1519 (9th Cir.
1996) (approving of the USS-POSCO test but finding it inapplicable to the two lawsuits
alleged). At least one district court has employed the USS-POSCO/Primetime 24 test to
strip a defendant of Noerr protection for a pattern of litigation. See Livingston Downs
Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Jefferson Downs Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 519, 538 (M.D. La. 2001).
Some district courts appear to have adopted the USS-POSCO/Primetime 24 test for
repetitive petitioning but have found insufficient allegations or facts to deny the defendants
Noerr protection. See, e.g., Twin City Bakery Workers & Welfare Fund v. Astra
Aktiebolag, 207 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Gen-Probe, Inc. v Amoco Corp.,
926 F. Supp. 948, 959 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
221
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in Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. National Broadcasting Co.,224 which involved
allegations that the defendants coordinated a series of signal-strength
challenges under the Satellite Home Viewer Act, without regard to the merits
of each, for the purpose of injuring a market rival.225 Applying this standard,
the court concluded that defendants were not entitled to Noerr protection
because Primetime 24 alleged a sufficiently low win-rate to suggest that the
signal-strength challenges were “‘brought pursuant to a policy of starting legal
proceedings without regard to the merits and for the purpose of injuring a
market rival.’”226
Another possible approach is to look at the financial viability of suits. Some
suits may be reasonable in the sense that the probability of winning is
sufficiently greater than zero but may appear unreasonable when probabilities
are weighted by outcome values and costs are taken into account.227 For
example, a reasonable inference to be taken from filing a suit with an expected
value of $1000, but that costs $10,000 to prosecute, may be that the suit has an
additional value of at least $9001 flowing from the direct effects on rivals.
Although the majority in PREI explicitly rejected an expected value test as an
objective screen in the context of a single suit,228 it may remain a viable
approach when applied to multiple filings. Further, despite PREI’s seeming
equation of economic viability with subjective motivation,229 this screen
clearly lends itself to objective measurement. Indeed, the PREI concurrence
suggested the expected value test as a method to evaluate shams in a series of
filings: “The label ‘sham’ . . . might also apply to a plaintiff who had some
reason to expect success on the merits but because of its tremendous cost
would not bother to achieve that result without the benefit of collateral injuries
imposed on its competitor by the legal process alone.”230
Clarify that intentional misrepresentations do not qualify for immunity. The
extent to which parties who use fraud or deceit to procure favorable
governmental action enjoy Noerr protection remains unclear. The Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of fraud on the patent office as a stand-alone
224

219 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id.
226 Id. (quoting USS-POSCO, 31 F.3d at 811).
227 Judge Posner articulated this approach in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,
694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982): “Many claims not wholly groundless would never be
sued on for their own sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be
too low to repay the investment in litigation.”
228 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (PREI), 508 U.S.
49, 65-66 (1993).
229 Id. at 61 (explaining that plaintiff must disprove legal viability before it will entertain
evidence of economic viability); id. at 65-66 (inquiring whether the expected award could
justify Columbia’s investment in litigation “concern[ing] Columbia’s economic motivations
in bringing the suit, which were rendered irrelevant by the objective legal reasonableness of
the litigation”).
230 Id. at 68-69 (Stevens, J., concurring).
225
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antitrust offense,231 and has twice hinted at the existence of a misrepresentation
exception to Noerr.232 However, the Court expressly declined to address
whether a general misrepresentation exception to Noerr exists,233 and to date,
the “sham” exception is the only exception to Noerr that the Supreme Court
has recognized. Under various theories, however, several lower courts have
refused to provide Noerr protection to misrepresentations.234 One theme that
emerges from this jurisprudence is that misrepresentations are condoned in the
political arena, but enjoy no immunity in more formal arenas, where fact
finders must assume the veracity of the parties before them.235
Despite some lower court rulings,236 because parties who lie to procure
favorable regulation are genuinely seeking government action, it appears
difficult to squeeze misrepresentations into the sham exception.237 A separate
exception is needed – one that is not grounded in notions of genuineness, but,
rather, that focuses on the extent to which falsehoods designed to procure
government action really advance any of Noerr’s underpinnings.
On its own, false speech does not advance any First Amendment interests.
Thus, there is no reason to protect fraud calculated to procure anticompetitive
government action. Nevertheless, in an effort to provide “breathing space” for
legitimate speech, the Supreme Court has crafted rules that offer some
protection for false speech.238 Consistent with the notion of crafting rules that
are unlikely to deter legitimate speech, the Court has held that baseless suits
should enjoy protection similar to that which false speech enjoys.239
Accordingly, only a baseless suit that is also subjectively motivated by an
unlawful purpose falls outside of Noerr’s protection.240 By limiting a
misrepresentation exception to Noerr to intentional falsehoods that are
calculated to obtain the government action at issue, courts take into account
deterrence concerns, leaving ample breathing space for legitimate petitions.241
231

See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1965).
232 See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 503 (1987); Cal.
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
233 See PREI, 508 U.S. at 61-62 n.6 (“We need not decide here whether and, if so, to
what extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant’s fraud or other
misrepresentations.”).
234 See NOERR-PENNINGTON REPORT, supra note 120, at 25-26 (citing cases from the
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Federal, and District of Columbia
circuits that support a misrepresentation exception to the Noerr doctrine).
235 Id. at 26-27.
236 See, e.g., Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1998).
237 See, e.g., 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 173, at ¶ 203a.
238 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
239 BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002).
240 See id.
241 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of Cal., 140 F.T.C. 123, 150 (2005).
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It is also important to point out that a misrepresentation designed to procure
anticompetitive government regulation is likely to cause harm orders of
magnitude larger than harm caused by the abuse of process; although the latter
can inflict competitive harm by imposing costs on a rival, the former conduct,
if successful, will result in government enforcement of an anticompetitive
scheme that will linger unless invalidated by a court or repealed by future
regulators, both unlikely outcomes. Because the stakes are higher in the
context of misrepresentations, therefore, the breathing space concerns should
be minimal.
Additionally, an exception for intentional misrepresentations does not
offend notions of federalism or limit government’s ability to obtain the
information necessary to govern. First, intentional falsehoods usurp the
governmental process; the resultant anticompetitive regulation does not
represent the will of the people, but, rather, a hijacking of the regulatory
structure. Second, we do not want government to make decisions based on
false information, so a rule that deters misrepresentations is likely to enhance
the accuracy of information provided to the government.
There is no principled reason to afford false speech in the political arena any
more protection than false speech made in other, more formal arenas, such as
regulatory or adjudicatory proceedings: falsehoods, regardless of their context,
advance no First Amendment interests, and there is no reason to think that
anticompetitive legislation obtained by fraud is any less likely to cause
competitive harm than fraudulently procured regulation or adjudication.
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, evidentiary concerns militate toward
limiting any such exception to more formal proceedings, such as adjudication
and rulemaking. The same reasons that counsel against allowing state action
immunity to turn on the motives underlying regulatory decisions, suggest that
it would be nearly impossible for an antitrust plaintiff to establish causation in
cases involving a decision-maker who enjoys broad discretion and does not
rely on the veracity of input to craft an output.
B.

Containment: Ex Ante Review of Proposed Measures

The previous Section discussed relaxing current interpretations of
immunities that hinder ex post challenges to anticompetitive state actions or
anticompetitive uses of the regulatory process. This Section explores the
possibility of ex ante intervention to prevent anticompetitive harm before it
occurs. An alternative to the ex post antitrust challenge to anticompetitive
state regulation is to allow the U.S. competition authority to have ex ante input
into policy-making. This power could range from informal input to veto
power. Correcting problems ahead of time is likely to be more efficient than
ex post remediation via the antitrust laws.242 As discussed in Part III,
competition authority input is commonplace in other jurisdictions.
242 See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1110-11 (2005).
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At the state level, ex ante prevention is a political and practical non-starter.
It is hard to envision politicians from any party acquiescing to a rule that
requires federal competition authority input into purely state matters. Further,
because states promulgate literally thousands of regulations that may affect
competition every year, the FTC and DOJ could not possibly perform even a
cursory review of state laws at current staff levels. Indeed, current FTC and
DOJ staff barely manage thirty advocacies annually.243 To review all relevant
state proposals would require dramatically increasing FTC and DOJ staff or
shifting most resources from enforcement to regulatory review. Finally, it is
not at all clear that a federal mandate requiring this type of review would
survive a challenge as an unconstitutional expansion of Congress’s commerce
power.244 A regime set up by federal mandate, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the Court’s reluctance to second-guess the competitive
effects of state regulation under the antitrust laws. Required ex ante review by
federal executive branch or independent agency staff to assess the competitive
effects of state regulation seems little different.
An alternative to federal review would be to have review performed by state
attorney general staff expert in competition law.245 This arrangement would
alleviate federalism concerns, and it is likely to reduce informational costs
because a state attorney general is in a much better position than federal
authorities to handle anticompetitive regulation and to alleviate state-level staff
243 Advocacy Filings by Date, FED. TRADE COMM’N, OFFICE OF POL’Y PLANNING,
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/advocacy_date.shtm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (listing thirteen
advocacy filings for the FTC and DOJ in 2009).
244 Despite the Court’s modern, expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
Congress’s power is still subject to outer limits and
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that
to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610, 618 (2000) (stating that although “‘[w]here economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained,’” regulation “of intrastate [matters] that [are] not directed at the instrumentalities,
channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the
States” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995))); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
565-68 (explaining that the Court “[does] not doubt that Congress has authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce,” yet “[t]hat authority, though broad, does not include the authority to
regulate each and every aspect of local [matters]”; moreover, “[t]o do so would require us to
conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not
enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local. This [the Court is] unwilling to do”).
245 This review would be different from review to determine antitrust compliance, which
already occurs in many states.
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concerns. If this regime arose from a federal mandate, however, federalism
and political concerns would still exist. Further, not all states’ attorneys
general have sufficient staff expertise in competition law to perform adequate
review. Thus, as in the case of federal review, state review would require
major increases in staff or a reallocation of funding from their enforcement
mission.
Ex ante competition authority review is likely to be a feasible option only at
the federal level, and because federal competition agencies cannot bring suit
against sister federal agencies or the legislative branch to stop anticompetitive
policies, ex ante review is likely to be the only effective tool to address
potentially anticompetitive policies. There is precedent for this approach.
Some laws require FTC and DOJ review of federal agency actions.246 Further,
the FTC and DOJ are often required to consult with agencies developing rules
that implicate competition,247 and currently engage in informal dialogue with
sister agencies and congressional staff on the competition effects of various
proposals. The FTC and DOJ, moreover, engage in formal advocacy with
federal agencies through the notice-and-comment portion of rule-making
procedure.248
Although it is clear that U.S. competition authorities have enjoyed input into
federal policy-making for some time, formal review requirements would
strengthen the agencies’ ability to force federal policy makers to take
competition values into account. At one end of the spectrum, Congress could
require legislative committees or federal agencies to consider the agencies’
competitive analysis when passing a law.249 Thus, the FTC and DOJ would
not exercise a veto power, but could instead force a public explanation of why
some values trump competition values. Congress also could give the FTC and
DOJ a veto power over some agency decisions. That is, policy makers would
have to address competition concerns to the agencies’ satisfaction before a
246 For example, the Department of Interior must seek antitrust review of its outer
continental shelf oil exploration leasing decisions. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(c)(3) (2010).
Likewise, the Department of Energy must consult with the antitrust agencies on potential
competitive impacts when promulgating a rule that authorizes or requires a commercial
standard. See 15 U.S.C. § 788(c) (2010).
247 See, e.g., Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, § 703(a),
120 Stat. 3198 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.).
248 See generally Letter from Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Dep’t
of Transp. (June 6, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/dotcomment.htm;
Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Jean A. Webb, Sec’y to the
Comm’n, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Jan. 12, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/040113cftccommenttext.pdf; Comment from the Staff of the
Bureau of Econ. et. al, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Food & Drug Admin. & Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. (Oct. 9, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/
fdafattyacidscomment.pdf.
249 This could be similar to Congressional Budget Office scoring for budgetary
implications.
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policy could be implemented. The political feasibility of this approach at the
legislative level is slight, however, as it is highly unlikely that Congress would
agree to circumscribe itself. Another doubtful, if slightly more likely, scenario
would require the agencies that promulgate regulations to obtain FTC and DOJ
approval prior to final enactment.
C.

Ex Post Assessment: A Research Program to Evaluate Effects

Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to
measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition. A research
program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the
consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions. Such a program could also
assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions
are realized in practice. By making the competitive costs of public
intervention more evident, such a program would inform public debate about
the continuation of existing restrictions and the future adoption of similar
measures. This form of analysis would be especially valuable if the
government restrictions were made subject to a sunset provision that forced
periodic reconsideration of the measures in question.
D.

Adjustments in Federal/State Collaboration

Existing U.S. jurisprudence governing the antitrust significance of state
action accords considerable discretion to state legislatures to enact measures
that restrict competition. In practice, this means that the front line of debate
and policy-making take place within the state legislative process. One can
imagine that antitrust units of the state attorneys general might expand their
efforts to track legislative developments and to advocate against measures that
curb competition.250 This expansion could be part of a federal/state partnership
in which federal antitrust agencies formally join their state counterparts in
preparing advocacies on these measures or providing assistance – in the form
of research and analysis – to states that making appearances in their own name.
CONCLUSION
Discussions about the appropriate content of competition policy among the
many jurisdictions with antitrust laws reflect a consensus that public restraints
upon rivalry deserve as much attention as private behavior. The U.S. antitrust
system, however, lags behind a number of other jurisdictions in its capacity to
deal effectively with government measures that restrict competition. A
valuable frontier for future U.S. work to achieve convergence in competition
policy is to pursue policies that align the United States more closely with its
global counterparts in their treatment of public intervention.

250

The possibilities for doing so are discussed in William E. Kovacic, Toward a
Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT 316, 326 (Richard A.
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004).

